Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence

Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence By Patricia A. Weitsman Palo Alto, CA: Standford University Press, 2014 279 pages $27.95 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] Allies are the most aggravating of people. They introduce considerations of their own nationalpolitics, none of which have the faintest bearing on the matter of immediate issue [but] their most annoying characteristic is the astonishing way they seem incapable of recognising how sound, how wise, how experienced are our views." Diary of Field-Marshal William J. Slim, commander of the British 14th Army in World War II In Waging War, Patricia A. Weitsman argues our understanding of what the late military historian Russell Weigley famously called "the American way of war" needs to be brought into the 21st-century. Weigley claimed annihilation--destroying the enemy's armed forces and (ideally) occupying his capital--was the basic American strategy in war. While European great powers hewed closely to the Clausewitzian understanding of war as a continuation of diplomacy by other means--a necessary limitation for nation-states embedded in a delicate continental balance of power--the United States approached war as kind of violent intermission to diplomacy: we negotiate, we fight, we negotiate again, making peace on our terms. Weigley's thesis cohered nicely with 20th-century notions of "American Exceptionalism" and strategic unilateralism. To Weitsman, however, that is its principal weakness: in fact, the United States doesn't simply make war (or peace) on its terms. America is embedded in a network of global alliances, coalitions, and institutions simultaneously enabling and constraining its power. As a result, Weitsman argues, the American way of war is profoundly multilateral --profoundly political. "The norm of multilateralism," she writes, "is entrenched in the American way of waging war." This means American policymakers and strategists must take into consideration the goals, objectives, and objections of its allies and coalition partners at all stages of war fighting--compromises can, and often do, frustrate policymakers, public opinion, and even the conduct of America's wars themselves. Waging War is not a book about the operational aspects of coalition warfare, though one can glean some insights from Weitsman's case studies. Her book is a contribution to scholarly debates about alliances and coalitions within the international relations and security studies disciplines and as a result may frustrate those professionally interested in the operational or political-military dynamics of alliance and coalition warfare. Weitsman frames her argument in the context of what she calls "realist institutionalism," attempting to bridge the gap between the two dominant strands of International Relations theorizing--realism, with its emphasis on interests, and neoliberalism, with its emphasis on formal and informal international institutions--showing military alliances and coalitions not only constrain America's strategic operations in war but also facilitate the exercising of American hegemonic power across the globe. …