爱是独立于道德责任的

Q3 Arts and Humanities International Journal of Applied Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-01-01 DOI:10.5840/ijap20201217135
Stephen Kershnar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

认识到人们在道德上不负责任,随之而来的一个担忧是,这将如何影响我们的人际关系。尤其值得关注的是,缺少这些东西是否会消除或减少爱。爱情与一些最可信的幸福理论有关。特别是,它可能被认为是引起快乐和满足欲望,从而带来幸福的享乐主义和欲望满足理论的幸福。它也可能被列入客观清单,使某人的生活变得更好,独立于快乐和欲望的满足。在这篇文章中,我支持强烈的亲态度理论,特别地,爱是强烈的情感、认知、有意和价值的亲态度的分离组合,关注事物的幸福。如果这种说法是正确的,那么爱在经验上和概念上是独立于道德责任的。因此,爱是独立于道德责任的。
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Love is Independent of Moral Responsibility
A concern that accompanies the recognition that people are not morally responsible is how this affects our relationships. In particular, there is concern as to whether the absence of these things eliminates or lessens love. Love is relevant on some of the most plausible theories of well-being. In particular, it might be thought to cause pleasure and fulfill desires and thus bring about well-being on hedonist and desire-fulfillment theories of well-being. It might also be included on the objective list of things that make someone’s life go better independent of pleasure and desire-fulfillment. In this article, I argue for the Intense Pro-Attitude Theory, specifically, that love is a disjunctive combination of intense affective, cognitive, intentional, and valuational pro-attitudes that focus on something’s well-being. If this account is correct, then love is empirically and conceptually independent of moral responsibility. Hence, love is independent of moral responsibility.
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来源期刊
International Journal of Applied Philosophy
International Journal of Applied Philosophy Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
8
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