{"title":"真理与模式(一)","authors":"F. Pataut","doi":"10.5840/bjp202214213","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I contrast two construals of the thesis that truth is independent of verifiability in principle: a modal one and a non modal one. I argue in favor of the modal construal and then, on that basis, that independence holds across the board, i.e., even for statements that are verifiable by us relative to familiar, customary, non-skeptical standards.","PeriodicalId":41126,"journal":{"name":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Truth and Modalities (I)\",\"authors\":\"F. Pataut\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/bjp202214213\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I contrast two construals of the thesis that truth is independent of verifiability in principle: a modal one and a non modal one. I argue in favor of the modal construal and then, on that basis, that independence holds across the board, i.e., even for statements that are verifiable by us relative to familiar, customary, non-skeptical standards.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41126,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Balkan Journal of Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Balkan Journal of Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp202214213\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Balkan Journal of Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/bjp202214213","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
I contrast two construals of the thesis that truth is independent of verifiability in principle: a modal one and a non modal one. I argue in favor of the modal construal and then, on that basis, that independence holds across the board, i.e., even for statements that are verifiable by us relative to familiar, customary, non-skeptical standards.
期刊介绍：
The Balkan Journal of Philosophy is a peer-reviewed international periodical, academic in spirit, that publishes high-quality papers on current problems and discussions in philosophy. While open to all fields and interests, the journal devotes special attention to the treatment of philosophical problems in the Balkans and south-eastern Europe, and to their influence on the development of philosophy in this region. All papers are publisihed in English. BJP is published under the auspices of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.
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