{"title":"遵循下级法院的先例","authors":"A. Bruhl","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2389198","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This Article examines the role of lower-court precedent in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisionmaking. The Supreme Court is rarely the first court to consider a legal question, and therefore the Court has the opportunity to be informed by and perhaps even persuaded by the views of the various lower courts that have previously addressed the issue. This Article considers whether the Court should give weight to lower-court precedent as a matter of normative theory and whether the Court in fact does so as a matter of practice. To answer the normative question, the Article analyzes and evaluates a variety of potential reasons to give weight to lower-court precedent, including reasons related to stability, constraint, and the wisdom of crowds. To address the descriptive question, the Article examines the current Justices’ voting behavior and reasoning, over a period of several recent years, in cases in which the Court resolves splits in the lower courts. The conclusions shed light on broader debates over interpretive methodology and the Supreme Court’s role as the manager of a large judicial system.","PeriodicalId":51436,"journal":{"name":"University of Chicago Law Review","volume":"29 38","pages":"1"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2014-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Following Lower-Court Precedent\",\"authors\":\"A. Bruhl\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2389198\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This Article examines the role of lower-court precedent in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisionmaking. The Supreme Court is rarely the first court to consider a legal question, and therefore the Court has the opportunity to be informed by and perhaps even persuaded by the views of the various lower courts that have previously addressed the issue. This Article considers whether the Court should give weight to lower-court precedent as a matter of normative theory and whether the Court in fact does so as a matter of practice. To answer the normative question, the Article analyzes and evaluates a variety of potential reasons to give weight to lower-court precedent, including reasons related to stability, constraint, and the wisdom of crowds. To address the descriptive question, the Article examines the current Justices’ voting behavior and reasoning, over a period of several recent years, in cases in which the Court resolves splits in the lower courts. The conclusions shed light on broader debates over interpretive methodology and the Supreme Court’s role as the manager of a large judicial system.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51436,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"University of Chicago Law Review\",\"volume\":\"29 38\",\"pages\":\"1\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-10-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"University of Chicago Law Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2389198\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Chicago Law Review","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2389198","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
This Article examines the role of lower-court precedent in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisionmaking. The Supreme Court is rarely the first court to consider a legal question, and therefore the Court has the opportunity to be informed by and perhaps even persuaded by the views of the various lower courts that have previously addressed the issue. This Article considers whether the Court should give weight to lower-court precedent as a matter of normative theory and whether the Court in fact does so as a matter of practice. To answer the normative question, the Article analyzes and evaluates a variety of potential reasons to give weight to lower-court precedent, including reasons related to stability, constraint, and the wisdom of crowds. To address the descriptive question, the Article examines the current Justices’ voting behavior and reasoning, over a period of several recent years, in cases in which the Court resolves splits in the lower courts. The conclusions shed light on broader debates over interpretive methodology and the Supreme Court’s role as the manager of a large judicial system.
期刊介绍:
The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.