联合国巴勒斯坦分治计划与国际法

Pub Date : 2021-10-27 DOI:10.1093/obo/9780199796953-0221
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This was also a view that was reiterated by other states when Israel applied for membership of the UN, and during the debate in the UN General Assembly to establish a special international regime for Jerusalem in 1949. Additionally, there is jurisprudence in the International Court of Justice concerning the South West Africa/Namibia cases, and judgments in Israeli and Italian courts that can be cited in support of this view. Statements made by UK officials in 1947 referred to Resolution 181 (II) as a decision of a court of international opinion. The views of the US Government and France were equivocal, although both issued statements that could be interpreted to mean that they viewed Resolution 181 (II) as normative, given the subsidiary powers conferred on the General Assembly by Article 22 of the UN Charter. The Arab states, on the other hand, opposed the resolution during the debates in 1947 on the basis that it was contrary to the Palestinian Arab people’s right of self-determination to establish a single unitary state over the whole territory. However, Israel and the Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) accepted Resolution 181 (II) as a basis for negotiation in the Lausanne Protocol of 12 May 1949, indicating that it was acceptable, in principle, as a basis for negotiating the territorial issue, before negotiations began in the UN Trusteeship Council and the UN General Assembly on establishing a special international regime for Jerusalem. Although Resolution 181 (II) was never implemented in the way it was foreseen, a UN Mediator was established with wide powers to continue the work of the Palestine Commission. 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引用次数: 2

摘要

1947年,联合王国和联合国巴勒斯坦问题特别委员会(联合国巴勒斯坦问题特别委员会)得出结论认为,自1922年以来一直受英国管理的国际联盟委托的巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人和犹太人已经有足够的能力管理自己。随后,联合国大会在第181 (II)号决议中通过了“未来巴勒斯坦政府”的“经济联盟分治计划”(第181 (II)号决议),该决议规定在该领土上建立两个国家,并为耶路撒耶路撒市建立一个特殊的国际制度。由于战争的爆发,该计划从未按照预期的方式实施,尽管联合国秘书处、苏联和犹太机构认为它是具有约束力的国际法行为。在以色列申请加入联合国时,以及1949年联合国大会为耶路撒冷建立特别国际制度的辩论中,其他国家也重申了这一观点。此外,可以引用国际法院关于西南非洲/纳米比亚案件的判例以及以色列和意大利法院的判决来支持这一观点。联合王国官员在1947年发表的声明中提到第181 (II)号决议是国际法院的决定。美国政府和法国的观点是模棱两可的,尽管两国发表的声明可以被解释为它们认为第181 (II)号决议是规范性的,因为《联合国宪章》第22条赋予大会的附属权力。另一方面,阿拉伯国家在1947年的辩论中反对该决议,理由是它违背了巴勒斯坦阿拉伯人民在整个领土上建立一个单一国家的自决权。然而,以色列和阿拉伯国家(埃及、约旦、黎巴嫩和叙利亚)在1949年5月12日的《洛桑议定书》中接受了第181 (II)号决议作为谈判的基础,表明在联合国托管理事会和联合国大会就建立耶路撒冷特别国际制度展开谈判之前,原则上可以接受该决议作为谈判领土问题的基础。尽管第181 (II)号决议从未按照预期的方式执行,但设立了一名联合国调解人,该调解人拥有广泛的权力,以继续巴勒斯坦委员会的工作。这些权力随后被移交给联合国巴勒斯坦和解委员会(UNCCP),之后联合国大会的多个国家承认巴勒斯坦人民是建立公正和持久和平的主要当事方(1974年11月22日联大第3236号决议,第4段),这些国家可以参加该委员会的工作,以促进他们的自决权。通过巴勒斯坦解放组织(巴解组织)的代表——最初作为观察员(1974年11月22日联大第3237号决议),然后作为观察国(2012年11月29日联大第67/19号决议)。因此,可以认为,巴勒斯坦人民保留了第181 (II)号决议中分配给阿拉伯国家的领土的所有权。这是国际社会在安理会和大会决议中多次支持的观点,以支持“两国解决方案”。阿拉伯国家对1947年第181 (II)号决议的反对是反对建立一个犹太国家。这些国家并不反对建立一个阿拉伯国家。因此,争论的焦点不是国家本身,也不是国家的头衔,而是国家的形态,以及它与犹太国家边界的位置。鉴于该专题的特殊性,对第181(二)号决议的大多数分析都采用国际法期刊文章或书籍章节的形式。此外,还有一些历史记载从更广泛的历史角度来考虑分割。到目前为止,大部分材料都来自联合国演讲、政府报告和法律备忘录中的第一手资料。
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The UN Partition Plan for Palestine and International Law
In 1947, the United Kingdom and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) concluded that Palestine’s Arabs and Jews, who had been subject to a British-administered League of Nations mandate since 1922, were sufficiently advanced to govern themselves. A “Plan of Partition with Economic Union” was subsequently adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 181 (II) “for the future Government of Palestine” (Resolution 181 (II)) that made provision for the establishment of two states in the territory along with a special international regime for the City of Jerusalem. The plan was never implemented in the way it was foreseen, due to the outbreak of war, although the UN Secretariat, the Soviet Union, and the Jewish Agency, considered it a binding act of international law. This was also a view that was reiterated by other states when Israel applied for membership of the UN, and during the debate in the UN General Assembly to establish a special international regime for Jerusalem in 1949. Additionally, there is jurisprudence in the International Court of Justice concerning the South West Africa/Namibia cases, and judgments in Israeli and Italian courts that can be cited in support of this view. Statements made by UK officials in 1947 referred to Resolution 181 (II) as a decision of a court of international opinion. The views of the US Government and France were equivocal, although both issued statements that could be interpreted to mean that they viewed Resolution 181 (II) as normative, given the subsidiary powers conferred on the General Assembly by Article 22 of the UN Charter. The Arab states, on the other hand, opposed the resolution during the debates in 1947 on the basis that it was contrary to the Palestinian Arab people’s right of self-determination to establish a single unitary state over the whole territory. However, Israel and the Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria) accepted Resolution 181 (II) as a basis for negotiation in the Lausanne Protocol of 12 May 1949, indicating that it was acceptable, in principle, as a basis for negotiating the territorial issue, before negotiations began in the UN Trusteeship Council and the UN General Assembly on establishing a special international regime for Jerusalem. Although Resolution 181 (II) was never implemented in the way it was foreseen, a UN Mediator was established with wide powers to continue the work of the Palestine Commission. These powers were subsequently transferred to the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), before a plurality of states in the UN General Assembly recognized the Palestinian people as a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace (GA Res 3236, 22 November 1974, para 4), who could participate in its work, in furtherance of their right to self-determination, through the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—initially as an observer (GA Res 3237, 22 November 1974), then as an observer state (GA Res 67/19, 29 November 2012). Accordingly, it could be argued that the Palestinian people retained title to the territories allotted to the Arab state in Resolution 181 (II). This is a view that has since been endorsed by the international community multiple times in Security Council and General Assembly resolutions in support of a “two-state solution.” The opposition the Arab states expressed toward Resolution 181 (II) in 1947 was opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state. These states were not opposed to the creation of an Arab state. The dispute, therefore, was not over statehood per se, or title, but over the shape that the state would take and the location of its boundary with the Jewish State. Given the specificity of the topic, most analyses of Resolution 181 (II) have taken the form of articles in international law journals or chapters in books. In addition, there are historical accounts that consider partition from a broader historical vantage point. By far, most of the material comes in the form of primary sources in UN speeches, government reports, and legal memorandums.
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