A2L:用于支付通道中心可伸缩性的匿名原子锁

Erkan Tairi, Pedro A. Moreno-Sánchez, Matteo Maffei
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引用次数: 42

摘要

支付通道集线器(PCHs)是解决区块链技术固有可扩展性问题的一种有希望的解决方案,它允许发送方和接收方通过一个称为“不转盘”的中介进行链下支付。虽然最先进的PCHs提供了针对恶意破坏者的安全和隐私保证,但它们依靠的是仅在少数加密货币中可用的基于脚本的功能,因此它们缺乏向后兼容性和效率等基本属性。在这项工作中,我们提出了第一个实现上述所有属性的PCH协议。我们的PCH建立在A2L的基础上,A2L是一种新的加密原语,它实现了有条件交易的三方协议,只有当接收者在发送方的帮助下解决了加密挑战,这意味着发送方已经向发送方支付了费用。我们在通用可组合性框架中证明了A2L(延续到我们的PCH构造)的安全性和隐私性保证,并提出了一个基于适配器签名和随机谜题的可证明的安全实例化。我们实现了A2L,并将其与最先进的比特币兼容PCH TumbleBit进行了比较。渐近地,A2L的通信复杂性是恒定的,而不是像TumbleBit那样在安全参数上是线性的。在实践中,A2L需要的带宽比TumleBit少约33倍,同时保持计算成本(或通过预处理技术提供2倍的加速)。这表明A2L(以及我们的PCH构造)现在就可以部署了。从理论上讲,我们首次证明了在只需要底层脚本语言的数字签名和时间锁功能的情况下,可以设计一个安全且保护隐私的PCH。在实践中,这一结果使我们的PCH向后兼容几乎所有可用的加密货币,即使是那些提供高度限制形式的脚本语言,如Ripple或Stellar。我们的构建的实际吸引力导致了COMIT网络的概念验证实施,这是一种专注于跨货币支付的区块链技术。
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A2L: Anonymous Atomic Locks for Scalability in Payment Channel Hubs
Payment channel hubs (PCHs) constitute a promising solution to the inherent scalability problem of blockchain technologies, allowing for off-chain payments between sender and receiver through an intermediary, called the tumbler. While state-of-the-art PCHs provide security and privacy guarantees against a malicious tumbler, they do so by relying on the scripting-based functionality available only at few cryptocurrencies, and they thus fall short of fundamental properties such as backwards compatibility and efficiency.In this work, we present the first PCH protocol to achieve all aforementioned properties. Our PCH builds upon A2L, a novel cryptographic primitive that realizes a three-party protocol for conditional transactions, where the tumbler pays the receiver only if the latter solves a cryptographic challenge with the help of the sender, which implies the sender has paid the tumbler. We prove the security and privacy guarantees of A2L (which carry over to our PCH construction) in the Universal Composability framework and present a provably secure instantiation based on adaptor signatures and randomizable puzzles. We implemented A2L and compared it to TumbleBit, the state-of-the-art Bitcoin-compatible PCH. Asymptotically, A2L has a communication complexity that is constant, as opposed to linear in the security parameter like in TumbleBit. In practice, A2L requires ~33x less bandwidth than TumleBit, while retaining the computational cost (or providing 2x speedup with a preprocessing technique). This demonstrates that A2L (and thus our PCH construction) is ready to be deployed today.In theory, we demonstrate for the first time that it is possible to design a secure and privacy-preserving PCH while requiring only digital signatures and timelock functionality from the underlying scripting language. In practice, this result makes our PCH backwards compatible with virtually all cryptocurrencies available today, even those offering a highly restricted form of scripting language such as Ripple or Stellar. The practical appealing of our construction has resulted in a proof-of-concept implementation in the COMIT Network, a blockchain technology focused on cross-currency payments.
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