为什么美军输掉了阿富汗

IF 1.2 3区 社会学 Q3 POLITICAL SCIENCE Armed Forces & Society Pub Date : 2022-07-07 DOI:10.1177/0095327X221100584
D. Travis
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引用次数: 1

摘要

为什么阿富汗作为美国的伙伴会动摇?美国在阿富汗的战争失败有很多原因,但美军在两个方面促成了它的失败。首先,受过常规战斗训练的美国作战部队对游击队进行了反恐行动(又名“搜索和摧毁”任务),结果是敌人的决心更加坚定,同时造成了广泛而无谓的平民伤亡。第二,没有美国的后勤和物资支持,阿富汗军队就无法存在。因为阿富汗军队的训练和装备是打一场常规战争,他们无法独立于美国的支持,也无法在一场旷日持久的内战中独自对抗游击队。因此,阿富汗安全部队没有得到适当的训练和装备,表明美军重复了越南战争的错误。有人认为,美国必须调整其常规战争思维,并将资源重新定向到对非常规对手进行有限战争的改进方式上。莫里斯·雅诺维茨(Morris Janowitz)所描述的警察部队概念是提高美军在这种有限战争中成功几率的可行方法。
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Why the U.S. Military Lost Afghanistan
Why did Afghanistan falter as a U.S. partner? America’s war in Afghanistan was lost for many reasons, but the U.S. military contributed to its downfall in two ways. First, U.S. combat units, trained to fight conventional battles, conducted counterterrorism operations (aka “search and destroy” missions) against guerilla forces that resulted in hardening the resolve of the enemy while causing widespread and senseless civilian casualties. Second, the Afghan military could not exist without U.S. logistical and material support. Because the Afghan Army was trained and equipped to fight a conventional-type war, they were incapable of operating independent of U.S. support, and could not survive on their own against guerrilla forces in a protracted civil war. Therefore, the Afghan security forces were not properly trained and equipped, demonstrating that the U.S. military repeated mistakes of the Vietnam War. It is argued that the United States must temper its conventional warfare mindset and re-direct resources toward improved ways to conduct limited wars against irregular adversaries. The constabulary forces concept described by Morris Janowitz is a feasible way to improve the chances that U.S. forces will succeed in such limited wars.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.00
自引率
28.60%
发文量
76
期刊介绍: Armed Forces & Society: an interdisciplinary journal publishing articles on military institutions, civil-military relations, arms control and peacemaking, and conflict management. The journal is international in scope with a focus on historical, comparative, and interdisciplinary discourse. The editors and contributors include political scientists, sociologists, historians, psychologists, scholars, and economists, as well as specialists in military organization and strategy, arms control, and peacekeeping.
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