经理人加速Seo决策的所有权框架:关联机构投资者在Reit行业的重要性

Q2 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management Pub Date : 2016-01-01 DOI:10.1080/10835547.2016.12089989
Jocelyn D. Evans, T. Jones, G. Mitchener
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引用次数: 2

摘要

执行概要。在本文中,我们提出了二级股权发行(SEO)决策的数学模拟,该决策捕获了低(例如,主动管理基金)或高(例如,被动指数投资者)监控成本的投资者的回报。校准后的解决方案与在存在高监控成本的机构时发布的高估seo一致。监控成本低的机构要么激励管理层发行价格合理的seo,要么导致CEO对价值下降的发行进行更严格的事后约束。有业务关系的机构的存在给seo的价值带来了不确定性。所有权网络联盟是有益的。
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An Ownership Framework for Managers' Accelerated Seo Decisions: The Importance of Connected Institutional Investors in the Reit Industry
Executive Summary. In this paper, we present a mathematical simulation of a secondary equity offer (SEO) decision that captures the payoffs for investors with either low (e.g., actively managed funds) or high (e.g., passive index investors) monitoring costs. The calibrated solutions are consistent with overvalued SEOs being issued when institutions with high monitoring costs are present. Institutions with low monitoring costs either incentivize management to issue fairly priced SEOs or lead to greater ex post discipline of the CEO for value decreasing issuances. The existence of institutions with business relationships creates uncertainty regarding the value of SEOs. Ownership network alliances are beneficial.
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来源期刊
Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management
Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
自引率
0.00%
发文量
13
期刊介绍: The Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management (JREPM) is a publication of the American Real Estate Society (ARES). Its purpose is to disseminate applied research on real estate investment and portfolio management.
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