支付违约和公司间流动性供应

Q4 Social Sciences Banking Law Journal Pub Date : 2013-11-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.966281
Reint Gropp, F. Boissay
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引用次数: 208

摘要

我们使用一组关于法国公司的独特数据表明,面临流动性冲击的信贷受限公司更有可能拖欠对供应商的付款。信贷受限的公司将相当大一部分冲击转嫁给了他们的供应商。这与企业相互提供流动性保险的观点是一致的,这种机制能够缓解信贷约束。我们表明,违约链在到达不受约束的公司时停止。流动性似乎是从能够获得外部融资的公司分配给供应链上信贷受限的公司。牛津大学出版社版权所有
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Payment Defaults and Interfirm Liquidity Provision
Using a unique data set on French firms, we show that credit constrained firms that face liquidity shocks are more likely to default on their payments to suppliers. Credit constrained firms pass on a sizeable fraction of such shocks to their suppliers. This is consistent with the idea that firms provide liquidity insurance to each other and that this mechanism is able to alleviate credit constraints. We show that the chain of defaults stops when it reaches unconstrained firms. Liquidity appears to be allocated from firms with access to outside finance to credit constrained firms along supply chains. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.
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来源期刊
Banking Law Journal
Banking Law Journal Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
0.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The Banking Law Journal helps you keep in touch with the leading thinking regarding the latest developments in banking law. It covers every area of major interest to bankers and attorneys, with practical material for bank counsel use, articles of current importance by recognized experts, plus digests of important cases from every jurisdiction. Leading practitioners share their cutting-edge analysis and give you practical guidance in all areas of banking law.
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