契约政府与结构宪法

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW Notre Dame Law Review Pub Date : 2012-05-15 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2057988
K. N. Brown
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引用次数: 2

摘要

尽管在西方历史的大部分时间里,私人政党都在履行政府职能,但主流行政法学者对现代联邦政府活动外包给私人承包商的程度表示关注。联邦承包商经常行使典型的“行政”性质的权力。他们制定法规,解释法律,管理对外援助,管理核武器基地和情报行动,审讯被拘留者,控制边境,设计监视系统,并在战区提供军事支持。行政法对私人承包商几乎没有什么约束,而现行的宪法原则——特别是国家行为和私人委托原则——要么无法让私人承包商遵守宪法规范,要么就完全奄奄一息。因此,在大量关于私有化的文献中出现的一个共同主题是问责制。没有公认的宪法理论有意义地禁止国会或总统将大量的政府自由裁量权转让给超出宪法权限的完全私人实体,对这一主题的学术分析相对较少。本文寻求一种宪法原则,可以用来解决那些超出美国人胃口的假想外包安排。在这种追求中,它将管理独立机构的法律视为从结构性宪法的角度评估外包关系的适当性的自然起点。然后介绍了两个观点,旨在激发对私有化合宪性的新思考:首先,所有行使联邦政府权力的行为者都应该被视为一个宪法连续体,而不是占据单独的私人/公共领域;其次,民主问责原则可能源于最高法院最近在自由企业基金诉公共公司会计监督委员会一案中的裁决,作为解决合同政府出错的宪法钩。
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Government by Contract and the Structural Constitution
Although private parties have performed government functions throughout most of Western history, mainstream administrative law scholarship is dotted with concerns over the extent to which modern federal government activities are outsourced to private contractors. Federal contractors routinely exercise authority that is classically “executive” in nature. They write regulations, interpret laws, administer foreign aid, manage nuclear weapons sites and intelligence operations, interrogate detainees, control borders, design surveillance systems, and provide military support in combat zones. Administrative law places few constraints on private contractors, and prevailing constitutional principles — the state action and private delegation doctrines, in particular — are either inept at holding private contractors to constitutional norms or utterly moribund. A common theme that appears in the vast literature on privatization, therefore, is accountability. There is no recognized constitutional theory that meaningfully prohibits Congress or the President from transferring significant amounts of discretionary governmental power to wholly private entities that operate beyond the purview of the Constitution, and there is relatively sparse scholarly analysis of the subject. This Article searches for a constitutional principle that could be employed to address hypothetical outsourcing arrangements that go too far for the American appetite. In that pursuit, it looks to the law governing independent agencies as a natural starting point for evaluating the propriety of outsourcing relationships from the standpoint of the structural Constitution. It then introduces two ideas with an eye toward sparking fresh thinking about the constitutionality of privatization: first, the notion that all actors exercising federal government power should be viewed along a constitutional continuum and not as occupying separate private/public spheres; and, second, that a democratic accountability principle may be derived from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, as a constitutional hook for addressing government-by-contract gone awry.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
11.10%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: In 1925, a group of eager and idealistic students founded the Notre Dame Lawyer. Its name was changed in 1982 to the Notre Dame Law Review, but all generations have remained committed to the original founders’ vision of a law review “synonymous with respect for law, and jealous of any unjust attacks upon it.” Today, the Law Review maintains its tradition of excellence, and its membership includes some of the most able and distinguished judges, professors, and practitioners in the country. Entirely student edited, the Law Review offers its members an invaluable occasion for training in precise analysis of legal problems and in clear and cogent presentation of legal issues.
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