{"title":"关于断言和真理的非谜题","authors":"John Turri","doi":"10.5840/logos-episteme202011435","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) improper yet permissible, and (b) reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.","PeriodicalId":37720,"journal":{"name":"Logos and Episteme","volume":"2014 1","pages":"475-479"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Non-puzzle about Assertion and Truth\",\"authors\":\"John Turri\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/logos-episteme202011435\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) improper yet permissible, and (b) reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37720,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Logos and Episteme\",\"volume\":\"2014 1\",\"pages\":\"475-479\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Logos and Episteme\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011435\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Logos and Episteme","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202011435","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) improper yet permissible, and (b) reproachable yet un-reproached. Assertion still has a factive norm.
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the journal publishes articles, reviews or discussion notes focused as well on problems concerning the general theory of knowledge, as on problems specific to the philosophy, methodology and ethics of science, philosophical logic, metaphilosophy, moral epistemology, epistemology of art, epistemology of religion, social or political epistemology, epistemology of communication. Studies in the history of science and of the philosophy of knowledge, or studies in the sociology of knowledge, cognitive psychology, and cognitive science are also welcome.
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