中央银行计划的民主危险

Pub Date : 2023-02-03 DOI:10.1515/ael-2022-0063
N. Coombs
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引用次数: 1

摘要

埃里克·莫内认为中央银行应该引入以福利为导向的信贷政策,并建议通过建立审议信贷委员会使这些新权力合法化。在这篇文章中,我认为莫内没有考虑到他的中央银行计划模型是如何隔离而不是使中央银行民主化的。由于对专家的信任度较低,而且对于如何最好地应对气候变化等棘手问题没有达成全社会共识,主要的危险在于,莫内的信贷委员会可能会允许政治行为者推行他们认为无法通过选民的议程。事实上,政治行为者可能认为,制定央行信贷政策比参与有争议的财政政策领域更可取,正是因为信贷政策的影响不容易被选民问责。我认为,信贷委员会不太可能为解决这些问题提供一个民主的渠道,因为它们将不可避免地把来自金融部门、工业和(非政府)组织的专家的声音——实际上是一种官僚政治——置于服从其决定的普通公众之上。
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The Democratic Dangers of Central Bank Planning
Abstract Eric Monnet makes the case that central banks should introduce welfare-oriented credit policies and suggests legitimating these new powers through the establishment of deliberative credit councils. In this article, I argue that Monnet fails to consider how his model of central bank planning might insulate rather than democratize central banking. With low trust in experts and no society-wide consensus about how best to respond to wicked problems such as climate change, the principal danger is that Monnet’s credit councils may allow political actors to pursue agendas they do not feel they can get past electorates. Indeed, political actors may see shaping central banks’ credit policies as preferable to engaging the contentious fiscal policy domain precisely because the effects of credit policies cannot be easily held to account by voters. I suggest that credit councils are unlikely to provide a democratic channel for redressing these problems because they will inevitably privilege the voices of experts from the financial sector, industry, and (non-)governmental organisations – a de facto epistocracy – over the lay publics subject to their decisions.
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