黑名单核心:基于机器学习的动态操作性能点黑名单,用于减轻电源管理安全攻击

Sheng Zhang, Adrian Tang, Zhewei Jiang, S. Sethumadhavan, Mingoo Seok
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引用次数: 6

摘要

大多数现代计算设备都可以为电源管理提供细粒度的工作频率和电压控制。正如最近的攻击所证明的那样,这些接口开辟了一类新的软件故障注入攻击,危及商品设备的安全性。CLKSCREW是最近发布的一种攻击,它延长设备的频率,使其超出其运行限制,从而引发故障,就是这样一种攻击。静态和永久地限制频率和电压调制空间,即保护带,可以减轻这种攻击,但它会导致性能下降和长时间的测试。相反,在本文中,我们提出了一种运行时技术,该技术使用神经网络模型动态地将不安全的运行性能点列入黑名单。该模型首先在设计时离线训练,然后在运行时通过检查一组选定的特征(如电源管理控制寄存器、时序误差信号和核心温度)进行调整。我们设计了算法和硬件,称为黑名单(BL)核心,能够高精度地检测和减轻这种基于电源管理的安全攻击。BL核心在功率、延迟和面积方面的开销相当小。
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Blacklist Core: Machine-Learning Based Dynamic Operating-Performance-Point Blacklisting for Mitigating Power-Management Security Attacks
Most modern computing devices make available fine-grained control of operating frequency and voltage for power management. These interfaces, as demonstrated by recent attacks, open up a new class of software fault injection attacks that compromise security on commodity devices. CLKSCREW, a recently-published attack that stretches the frequency of devices beyond their operational limits to induce faults, is one such attack. Statically and permanently limiting frequency and voltage modulation space, i.e., guard-banding, could mitigate such attacks but it incurs large performance degradation and long testing time. Instead, in this paper, we propose a run-time technique which dynamically blacklists unsafe operating performance points using a neural-net model. The model is first trained offline in the design time and then subsequently adjusted at run-time by inspecting a selected set of features such as power management control registers, timing-error signals, and core temperature. We designed the algorithm and hardware, titled a BlackList (BL) core, which is capable of detecting and mitigating such power management-based security attack at high accuracy. The BL core incurs a reasonably small amount of overhead in power, delay, and area.
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