{"title":"不同的影响和怀孕:第七章的其他住宿要求","authors":"L. Hébert","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2641727","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There has been a good deal of attention focused recently on questions concerning how employers are allowed to treat pregnant women in the workplace under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued revised guidance addressing issues of pregnancy, including the requirements imposed by Title VII with respect to the accommodation of disabling conditions experienced by women who are pregnant or who have recently given birth. And the United States Supreme Court has recently decided a case, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., which addresses the circumstances under which an employer will be found to have violated Title VII’s prohibition against intentional discrimination for refusing to provide the same accommodation to women affected by pregnancy as that employer provides to a number of other categories of employees. The disparate treatment theory, on which both the Young case and the EEOC guidance are focused, is undoubtedly an important resource for women who are affected by pregnancy and childbirth to seek accommodations similar to those provided to other employees. But neither the Young case nor the new EEOC guidance focuses on the provision of Title VII that is most likely to provide a mandate for employers to provide accommodation to women affected by pregnancy who experience temporary inability to perform part or all of their job functions. That provision, not raised at all in the decision before the Supreme Court and slighted by the EEOC guidance, is the prohibition on employers maintaining even pregnancy-neutral policies and practices that disproportionately disadvantage women on the basis of pregnancy and cannot be justified by business necessity. It is the disparate impact theory, rather than the disparate treatment theory, in which Title VII’s requirement to accommodate pregnancy is most likely to be found.","PeriodicalId":87421,"journal":{"name":"The American University journal of gender, social policy & the law","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-08-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Disparate Impact and Pregnancy: Title VII's Other Accommodation Requirement\",\"authors\":\"L. Hébert\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2641727\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"There has been a good deal of attention focused recently on questions concerning how employers are allowed to treat pregnant women in the workplace under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued revised guidance addressing issues of pregnancy, including the requirements imposed by Title VII with respect to the accommodation of disabling conditions experienced by women who are pregnant or who have recently given birth. And the United States Supreme Court has recently decided a case, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., which addresses the circumstances under which an employer will be found to have violated Title VII’s prohibition against intentional discrimination for refusing to provide the same accommodation to women affected by pregnancy as that employer provides to a number of other categories of employees. The disparate treatment theory, on which both the Young case and the EEOC guidance are focused, is undoubtedly an important resource for women who are affected by pregnancy and childbirth to seek accommodations similar to those provided to other employees. 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引用次数: 4
摘要
最近,根据1964年《民权法案》第七章,雇主如何在工作场所对待孕妇的问题引起了很多关注。平等就业机会委员会发布了关于怀孕问题的订正指导,包括第七章关于照顾怀孕或刚刚分娩的妇女所经历的残疾情况的要求。美国最高法院最近裁决了一个案件,Young诉联合包裹服务公司(Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc.),该案件涉及在何种情况下,雇主因拒绝为怀孕妇女提供与雇主为其他一些类别的雇员提供的相同便利而被认定违反了第七章禁止故意歧视的规定。Young案和平等就业机会委员会的指导方针所关注的差别待遇理论,对于受到怀孕和分娩影响的女性来说,无疑是一个重要的资源,可以帮助她们寻求与其他员工类似的待遇。但无论是扬案还是新的平等就业机会委员会指南,都没有把重点放在第七章的规定上,因为第七章最有可能授权雇主为因怀孕而暂时无法履行部分或全部工作职能的女性提供便利。在最高法院的判决中根本没有提到这一条款,平等就业机会委员会的指导方针也没有提到这一条款,即禁止雇主维持甚至与怀孕无关的政策和做法,这些政策和做法会因怀孕而对女性造成不成比例的不利,而且不能以商业需要为理由。在《教育法第七章》对怀孕的要求中,最有可能找到的是差别影响理论,而不是差别待遇理论。
Disparate Impact and Pregnancy: Title VII's Other Accommodation Requirement
There has been a good deal of attention focused recently on questions concerning how employers are allowed to treat pregnant women in the workplace under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has issued revised guidance addressing issues of pregnancy, including the requirements imposed by Title VII with respect to the accommodation of disabling conditions experienced by women who are pregnant or who have recently given birth. And the United States Supreme Court has recently decided a case, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., which addresses the circumstances under which an employer will be found to have violated Title VII’s prohibition against intentional discrimination for refusing to provide the same accommodation to women affected by pregnancy as that employer provides to a number of other categories of employees. The disparate treatment theory, on which both the Young case and the EEOC guidance are focused, is undoubtedly an important resource for women who are affected by pregnancy and childbirth to seek accommodations similar to those provided to other employees. But neither the Young case nor the new EEOC guidance focuses on the provision of Title VII that is most likely to provide a mandate for employers to provide accommodation to women affected by pregnancy who experience temporary inability to perform part or all of their job functions. That provision, not raised at all in the decision before the Supreme Court and slighted by the EEOC guidance, is the prohibition on employers maintaining even pregnancy-neutral policies and practices that disproportionately disadvantage women on the basis of pregnancy and cannot be justified by business necessity. It is the disparate impact theory, rather than the disparate treatment theory, in which Title VII’s requirement to accommodate pregnancy is most likely to be found.