保护宪法不受人民侵害:对第五节权力的司法限制

IF 1.5 3区 社会学 Q1 LAW Indiana Law Journal Pub Date : 2003-02-16 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.378500
R. Post, Reva B. Siegel
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引用次数: 21

摘要

在阿拉巴马大学董事会诉加勒特案中,最高法院认为,除非国会首先确定了在司法上可纠正的违反宪法行为的历史和模式,否则国会不能行使其根据第十四条修正案第5条制定的立法来执行第十四条修正案的规定。加勒特的前提是,宪法是一份只对法院说话的法律文件。这篇文章批评了这种“法律中心主义”的宪法观点,这种观点在布尔恩市诉弗洛雷斯案之后的几年里越来越多地影响了法院的第5条判例。我们认为,宪法并不完全是一份法律文件。宪法还具有重要的政治意义,因为它表达了国家对其定义价值和承诺的理解。因此,解释宪法既是行使法律权威,也是行使政治权威。最高法院必须行使布兰代斯所说的“政治家风度”,以调解这两种形式的权威之间的紧张关系。最高法院最近审理的第5条案件推翻了超过一代人的政治才能,在这种政治才能中,最高法院精心制定的原则给政府的政治部门以很大的余地来解释宪法权利,而不损害司法审查或司法至上。实际上,决定库珀诉亚伦案的法院也决定了卡岑巴赫诉摩根案,后者推迟了国会根据第5条行使权力的努力。在1964年至1997年期间,最高法院有系统地模糊了法定标准和宪法标准之间的关系,以便最高法院可以同时肯定第5条立法,而不必对第十四条修正案第1条作出任何明确的解释。通过这种方式,最高法院可以鼓励联邦政府中受欢迎的部门参与创造宪法文化,这反过来又深刻地影响了最高法院自己对第十四条修正案的理解。最高法院最近的第5条判例压制了司法机构与联邦政府受欢迎的部门之间的这一重要对话。
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Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, the Court held that Congress can not exercise its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment unless Congress first identifies a history and pattern of judicially redressible constitutional violations. Garrett rests on the premise that the Constitution is a legal document that speaks only to courts. This essay criticizes this "juricentric" view of the Constitution, which in the years since City of Boerne v. Flores has come increasingly to shape the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence. We argue that the Constitution is not an exclusively legal document. The Constitution also possesses significant political dimensions, because it expresses the nation's understanding of its defining values and commitments. To interpret the Constitution is therefore to exercise both legal and political authority. The Court must exercise what Brandeis called "statesmanship" in order to mediate the tension between these two forms of authority. The Court's recent Section 5 cases overturn more than a generation of such statesmanship, in which the Court crafted doctrine that gave substantial leeway to the political branches of government to interpret constitutional rights without compromising either judicial review or judicial supremacy. Virtually the same Court that decided Cooper v. Aaron also decided Katzenbach v. Morgan, which deferred to congressional efforts to exercise its power under Section 5. In the period between 1964 and 1997, the Court systematically blurred the relationship between statutory and constitutional standards, so that the Court could simultaneously affirm Section 5 legislation without committing itself to any definitive interpretation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this way, the Court could encourage the participation of the popular branches of the federal government in the creation of constitutional culture, which in turn profoundly influenced the Court's own understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence suppresses this important dialogue between the judiciary and the popular branches of the federal government.
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期刊介绍: Founded in 1925, the Indiana Law Journal is a general-interest academic legal journal. The Indiana Law Journal is published quarterly by students of the Indiana University Maurer School of Law — Bloomington. The opportunity to become a member of the Journal is available to all students at the end of their first-year. Members are selected in one of two ways. First, students in the top of their class academically are automatically invited to become members. Second, a blind-graded writing competition is held to fill the remaining slots. This competition tests students" Bluebook skills and legal writing ability. Overall, approximately thirty-five offers are extended each year. Candidates who accept their offers make a two-year commitment to the Journal.
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