董事会中的收购:伯克与熊彼特

R. Gilson, Reinier H. Kraakman
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引用次数: 9

摘要

这篇文章是为纪念马丁·利普顿1979年的文章《目标公司董事会的收购出价》发表25周年而写的。在我们看来,《收购出价》是伯克式对熊彼特式混乱世界的再现,而熊彼特式混乱世界在上世纪80年代,随着德崇证券(Drexel Burnham)通过垃圾债券市场实现金融民主化,达到了顶峰。但具有讽刺意味的是,今天,在特拉华州最高法院采纳了利普顿的许多观点很久之后,出现了一个新的公司控制市场,它不再构成威胁,也不再支持上世纪80年代市场创造的机会。今天的战略竞标者和他们的目标有着相同的董事会观点。正是由于这个原因,“说不”不再是曾经的战斗口号。这在过去曾引起轰动,正是因为敌意收购可以被可信地描述为对现状的全面威胁——没有人会对今天的战略竞购者这样说。公司控制权市场现在是一个同行评议的过程,而不是系统性变革的工具。结果,在保守主义者看来,失去的恰恰是得到的:企业控制市场的能力,这种能力点燃了我们认为对美国经济非常有益的活力。尽管利普顿可能仍然会在今天的战斗中输掉允许目标对内部收购说不的战斗,但他仍然会赢得更大的战争。至少就目前而言,董事会与我们在上世纪80年代短暂看到的那种真正熊彼特式的企业控制市场的力量隔绝开来。
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Takeovers in the Boardroom: Burke Versus Schumpeter
This article was written for a symposium on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Martin Lipton's 1979 article, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom. In our view, Takeover Bids is a Burkean take on a messy Schumpeterian world that, during 1980s, reached its apex in Drexel Burnham's democratization of finance through the junk bond market. But the irony is that today, long after the Delaware Supreme Court has adopted many of Lipton's views, there is a new market for corporate control that no longer poses the threats - or supports the opportunities - that the market of the 1980s created. Today's strategic bidders and their targets share the same boardroom views. And for precisely this reason, "just say no" is no longer the battle cry that it once was. It stirred the crowds in the past precisely because hostile takeovers could be credibly depicted as a sweeping threat to the status quo - a claim that no one would make about today's strategic bidders. The market for corporate control now is a process of peer review, rather than an instrument of systemic change. What is lost as a result is just what, in the conservative view, has been gained: the capacity of the market for corporate control to ignite the dynamism that in our view has served the U.S. economy so well. Although Lipton may still lose today's battle to allow targets to just say no to intra-establishment takeovers, he will still have won the larger war. For now, at least, boardrooms are insulated from much of the force of a truly Schumpeterian market in corporate control of the sort we briefly glimpsed during the 1980s.
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