专家证据真的不同吗

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW Notre Dame Law Review Pub Date : 2013-02-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2210397
F. Schauer, Barbara A. Spellman
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引用次数: 6

摘要

道伯特诉梅雷尔陶氏制药公司案及其后续案件对科学证据和其他专家证据的采纳提出了严格的可靠性标准,在很大程度上改变了美国的证据法。道伯特革命一直受到强烈的支持和同样强烈的批评,但很少有批评者,自道伯特以来就没有人问过,为什么首先要区别对待专家证据。一个多世纪以来的普遍假设是,专家证据受到区别对待,因为陪审团(和法官)本身不具备相关的专业知识,因此有可能系统性地高估这些证据。这种高估可能是由于无知,或者是由于新手被专家的资历和外表所蒙蔽,但是,将高估作为区别对待专家证据的主要基础的信念仍然存在,不仅产生了道伯特,而且产生了专门对待专家证据的悠久历史。然而,事实证明,长期以来估值过高的假设并没有得到这项研究的支持。几十年的研究(主要是心理学家的研究)表明,陪审团高估专家证据的普遍假设在很大程度上是没有根据的。事实上,现代研究表明,目击者和其他所谓的直接证据被高估了。依靠陪审团高估专家证词的错误假设和同样错误的对直接证词不高估的假设,证据法得出了一种基于错误经验基础的区分。此外,就专家证据和其他证据之间的区别而言,也取决于外行证人提供的事实和来自专家的推论(意见)之间的区别,这种区别不仅被外行意见的现代处理所削弱,而且被大量关于普通人在生活的各个方面所做的判断依赖于专家的哲学工作所削弱。
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Is Expert Evidence Really Different
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, which along with its successor cases has imposed demanding standards of reliability on the admission of scientific and other expert evidence, has transformed much of American evidence law. The Daubert revolution has been subject to strong endorsement and equally strong criticism, but few critics, and none since Daubert, have asked why expert evidence is treated differently in the first place. The common assumption, going back over a century, is that expert evidence is treated differently because of the risk that juries (and judges), not themselves possessed of the relevant expertise, will systematically overvalue such evidence. The overvaluation may be based on ignorance, or on novices being overly impressed by expert credentials and trappings, but the belief in overvaluation as the primary foundation for the distinct treatment of expert evidence persists, generating not only Daubert but also a long history of treating expert evidence specially. It turns out, however, that the longstanding assumption of overvaluation is unsupported by the research. Several decades of research, mostly by psychologists, shows the common assumptions of jury overvaluation of expert evidence to be large unfounded. Indeed, modern research shows that it is eyewitness and other so-called direct evidence that is overvalued. By relying on the erroneous assumption of jury overvaluation of expert testimony and the equally erroneous assumption of non-overvaluation of direct testimony, the law of evidence has drawn a distinction that rests on a false empirical basis. Moreover, insofar as the distinction between expert and other evidence also rests on a distinction between the facts that lay witnesses offer and the inferences (opinions) that come from experts, this distinction is undercut not only by the modern treatment of lay opinion, but by a great deal of philosophical work on the expert-dependence of the judgments that ordinary people make in all aspects of their lives.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
11.10%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: In 1925, a group of eager and idealistic students founded the Notre Dame Lawyer. Its name was changed in 1982 to the Notre Dame Law Review, but all generations have remained committed to the original founders’ vision of a law review “synonymous with respect for law, and jealous of any unjust attacks upon it.” Today, the Law Review maintains its tradition of excellence, and its membership includes some of the most able and distinguished judges, professors, and practitioners in the country. Entirely student edited, the Law Review offers its members an invaluable occasion for training in precise analysis of legal problems and in clear and cogent presentation of legal issues.
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