{"title":"科学与充分理性原则:杜夏·特雷特与沃尔夫","authors":"Aaron Wells","doi":"10.1086/723961","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"I argue that Émilie Du Châtelet breaks with Christian Wolff regarding the scope and epistemological content of the principle of sufficient reason, despite his influence on her basic ontology and their agreement that the principle of sufficient reason has foundational importance. These differences have decisive consequences for the ways in which Du Châtelet and Wolff conceive of science.","PeriodicalId":42878,"journal":{"name":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","volume":"37 1","pages":"24 - 53"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Science and the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Du Châtelet contra Wolff\",\"authors\":\"Aaron Wells\",\"doi\":\"10.1086/723961\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"I argue that Émilie Du Châtelet breaks with Christian Wolff regarding the scope and epistemological content of the principle of sufficient reason, despite his influence on her basic ontology and their agreement that the principle of sufficient reason has foundational importance. These differences have decisive consequences for the ways in which Du Châtelet and Wolff conceive of science.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42878,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":\"37 1\",\"pages\":\"24 - 53\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-12-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1086/723961\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"HOPOS-The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1086/723961","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
我认为Émilie Du chtelet在充分理性原则的范围和认识论内容上与Christian Wolff决裂，尽管他对她的基本本体论有影响，并且他们一致认为充分理性原则具有基础性的重要性。这些差异对杜夏·特雷特和沃尔夫理解科学的方式产生了决定性的影响。
Science and the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Du Châtelet contra Wolff
I argue that Émilie Du Châtelet breaks with Christian Wolff regarding the scope and epistemological content of the principle of sufficient reason, despite his influence on her basic ontology and their agreement that the principle of sufficient reason has foundational importance. These differences have decisive consequences for the ways in which Du Châtelet and Wolff conceive of science.
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