{"title":"使用模型检查验证容错安全I&C系统","authors":"A. Pakonen, I. Buzhinsky","doi":"10.1109/ICIT.2019.8755014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Model checking has been successfully used for detailed formal verification of instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, as long as the focus has been on the application logic, alone. In safety-critical applications, fault tolerance is also an important aspect, but introducing I&C hardware failure modes to the formal models comes at a significant computational cost. Previous attempts have led to state space explosion, and prohibitively long processing times. In this paper, we present a method for adding hardware component failures and communication delays into I&C application logic models for the NuSMV symbolic model checker. Based on a case study built around a semi-fictitious, four-redundant nuclear power plant protection system, we demonstrate how even detailed system designs can be verified, if the focus is kept on single failure tolerance.","PeriodicalId":6701,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT)","volume":"4 1","pages":"969-974"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Verification of fault tolerant safety I&C systems using model checking\",\"authors\":\"A. Pakonen, I. Buzhinsky\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICIT.2019.8755014\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Model checking has been successfully used for detailed formal verification of instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, as long as the focus has been on the application logic, alone. In safety-critical applications, fault tolerance is also an important aspect, but introducing I&C hardware failure modes to the formal models comes at a significant computational cost. Previous attempts have led to state space explosion, and prohibitively long processing times. In this paper, we present a method for adding hardware component failures and communication delays into I&C application logic models for the NuSMV symbolic model checker. Based on a case study built around a semi-fictitious, four-redundant nuclear power plant protection system, we demonstrate how even detailed system designs can be verified, if the focus is kept on single failure tolerance.\",\"PeriodicalId\":6701,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT)\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"969-974\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIT.2019.8755014\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICIT.2019.8755014","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Verification of fault tolerant safety I&C systems using model checking
Model checking has been successfully used for detailed formal verification of instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, as long as the focus has been on the application logic, alone. In safety-critical applications, fault tolerance is also an important aspect, but introducing I&C hardware failure modes to the formal models comes at a significant computational cost. Previous attempts have led to state space explosion, and prohibitively long processing times. In this paper, we present a method for adding hardware component failures and communication delays into I&C application logic models for the NuSMV symbolic model checker. Based on a case study built around a semi-fictitious, four-redundant nuclear power plant protection system, we demonstrate how even detailed system designs can be verified, if the focus is kept on single failure tolerance.