回收社会困境中的决策与正当性。2。

Q4 Social Sciences Sociological Theory and Methods Pub Date : 2007-01-01 DOI:10.11218/OJJAMS.22.49
M. Shinoki, Kunihiro Kimura
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在Kimura和Shinoki(2007)中,在批判了Diekmann和Preisendörfer(1998)之后;2003)关于协调态度和行为之间差异的认知策略的观点,我们构建了一个潜在的“社会困境”情况下的决策(理性选择)和辩护(认知失调减少)两阶段模型,重点关注回收问题。我们从模型中推导出几个命题,并将其中一些转化为可证伪的预测。本文通过对日本仙台市一项社会调查数据的分析,验证了上述预测:(1)平均而言,贡献者对他人贡献的估计大于非贡献者对他人贡献的估计(“虚假共识效应”);(2)认为自己的边际贡献对回收系统的良好运行起着重要作用的出资人比例大于认为自己的边际贡献对回收系统的良好运行起着重要作用的非出资人比例;(3)平均而言,有贡献者的环境问题规范意识强于非贡献者。我们发现我们的预测几乎得到了支持。我们还在自然环境中对错误共识效应的机制进行了“关键实验”。结果表明,我们的模型比选择性暴露假说更好地解释了这一现象。为了考虑我们需要什么样的研究,并澄清我们模型的政策含义,我们研究了一些可能反对我们模型的意见。
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Decision and Justification in the Social Dilemma of Recycling. II.
In Kimura and Shinoki (2007), after criticizing Diekmann and Preisendörfer’s (1998; 2003) argument on the cognitive strategies to harmonize the discrepancy between attitudes and behaviors, we constructed a two-stage model of decision-making (rational choice) and justification (cognitive dissonance reduction) in a potential “social dilemma” situation, focusing on the problem of recycling. We deduced several propositions from our model and translated some of them into falsifiable predictions. In this paper, we analyze data from a social survey conducted in Sendai, Japan, in order to test these predictions: (1) On average, contributors’ estimate of others’ contribution is greater than non-contributors’ estimate of others’ contribution (the “false consensus effect”); (2) The proportion of the contributors who think that their marginal contribution plays a significant role in the well-functioning of the recycling system is greater than that of the non-contributors who think that their marginal contribution plays a significant role in the well-functioning of the recycling system; (3) On average, the normative consciousness concerning environmental problems is stronger among contributors than among non-contributors. We find that our predictions are almost supported. We also conduct a “critical experiment” in the natural settings on the mechanisms for the false consensus effect. The result reveals that our model is better than the selective exposure hypothesis in explaining it. We examine some possible objections to our model in order to consider what kind of research we need and to clarify the policy implication of our model.
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Sociological Theory and Methods
Sociological Theory and Methods Social Sciences-Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
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