多股投资者处于不利地位吗?来自晨星管理等级的证据。

Jonathan Handy, Thomas I. Smythe
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文分析了利用财务顾问/经纪人的投资者是否被系统地引导到治理质量较低的共同基金投资中。通过使用晨星管理等级和分析董事会质量、管理激励、费用评级和企业文化评级,我们得出结论,多股共同基金(MS基金)的投资者确实投资于治理质量较低的基金。具体来说,有序概率回归表明,MS基金不太可能获得更高的董事会质量评级,不太可能获得更高的管理激励评级,也不太可能获得更高的收费评级。研究结果表明,美国证券交易委员会(sec)等监管机构应该调查这些投资,以确保散户投资者不会处于不利地位。
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Are Multiple Share Class Investors Disadvantaged? Evidence from Morningstar Stewardship Grades.
This paper analyzes whether or not investors who utilize financial advisors/brokers are systematically directed to mutual fund investments that have lower quality governance. By utilizing the Morningstar Stewardship Grades and analyzing the Board Quality, Managerial Incentive, Fee Rating, and Corporate Culture Rating, we conclude that investors in multiple share class mutual funds (MS funds) are indeed investing in funds that have lower quality governance. Specifically, ordered probit regressions suggest that MS funds are less likely to have higher board quality ratings, less likely to have higher managerial incentive ratings, and are less likely to have higher fee ratings. The results suggest that regulating bodies like the US Securities and Exchange Commissions should investigate these investments to make sure retail investors are not being disadvantaged.
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