{"title":"解读土耳其防空和导弹防御系统的“旋转木马”","authors":"Sıtkı Egeli","doi":"10.20991/allazimuth.470640","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"At some point during 2013, Turkey’s political authority began to treat the in-country development and production of long-range air and missile defense systems as a priority. Soon after, they announced their decision to favor a Chinese offer that came complete with licensed production and the promise of technology transfer. Yet, with this decision came NATO’s objections and challenges around integration and information security. The 2015 decision to rollback the pro-China decision, and opt instead for the indigenous development of air and missile defense systems (in close conjunction with a foreign technological and industrial partner) was triggered by Turkey’s disillusion with the content of China’s technology transfer package. Subsequently, this new partner became a team comprising France and Italy; Turkish industry tied itself to this team in developing Europe’s next-generation missile defense capability. Then came the Turkish government’s 2017 decision to purchase off-the-shelf, standalone S-400 systems from Russia. This decision was an anomaly, and had all the characteristics of a top-down decision cycle running afoul of technical, operational, and industrial criteria. Turkey’s political figures have justified the S-400 order by citing the benefits of in-country production, access to technologies, not to mention the West’s refusal to sell comparable systems; but these justifications have been refuted by the Russian side and/or in discordant statements by Turkish institutions, authorities, and political figures themselves","PeriodicalId":51976,"journal":{"name":"All Azimuth-A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2018-10-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"11","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Making Sense of Turkey’s Air and Missile Defense Merry-go-round\",\"authors\":\"Sıtkı Egeli\",\"doi\":\"10.20991/allazimuth.470640\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"At some point during 2013, Turkey’s political authority began to treat the in-country development and production of long-range air and missile defense systems as a priority. Soon after, they announced their decision to favor a Chinese offer that came complete with licensed production and the promise of technology transfer. Yet, with this decision came NATO’s objections and challenges around integration and information security. The 2015 decision to rollback the pro-China decision, and opt instead for the indigenous development of air and missile defense systems (in close conjunction with a foreign technological and industrial partner) was triggered by Turkey’s disillusion with the content of China’s technology transfer package. Subsequently, this new partner became a team comprising France and Italy; Turkish industry tied itself to this team in developing Europe’s next-generation missile defense capability. Then came the Turkish government’s 2017 decision to purchase off-the-shelf, standalone S-400 systems from Russia. This decision was an anomaly, and had all the characteristics of a top-down decision cycle running afoul of technical, operational, and industrial criteria. Turkey’s political figures have justified the S-400 order by citing the benefits of in-country production, access to technologies, not to mention the West’s refusal to sell comparable systems; but these justifications have been refuted by the Russian side and/or in discordant statements by Turkish institutions, authorities, and political figures themselves\",\"PeriodicalId\":51976,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"All Azimuth-A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-10-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"11\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"All Azimuth-A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.470640\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"All Azimuth-A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.470640","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Making Sense of Turkey’s Air and Missile Defense Merry-go-round
At some point during 2013, Turkey’s political authority began to treat the in-country development and production of long-range air and missile defense systems as a priority. Soon after, they announced their decision to favor a Chinese offer that came complete with licensed production and the promise of technology transfer. Yet, with this decision came NATO’s objections and challenges around integration and information security. The 2015 decision to rollback the pro-China decision, and opt instead for the indigenous development of air and missile defense systems (in close conjunction with a foreign technological and industrial partner) was triggered by Turkey’s disillusion with the content of China’s technology transfer package. Subsequently, this new partner became a team comprising France and Italy; Turkish industry tied itself to this team in developing Europe’s next-generation missile defense capability. Then came the Turkish government’s 2017 decision to purchase off-the-shelf, standalone S-400 systems from Russia. This decision was an anomaly, and had all the characteristics of a top-down decision cycle running afoul of technical, operational, and industrial criteria. Turkey’s political figures have justified the S-400 order by citing the benefits of in-country production, access to technologies, not to mention the West’s refusal to sell comparable systems; but these justifications have been refuted by the Russian side and/or in discordant statements by Turkish institutions, authorities, and political figures themselves
期刊介绍:
All Azimuth is a bi-annual journal that provides a forum for academic studies on foreign policy analysis and peace research as well as theoretically-oriented policy pieces on international issues. We particularly welcome research on the nexus of peace, security, and development. We aim to publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and engaging in scholarly dialogue between the “center” and the “periphery”. We strongly encourage, therefore, publications with homegrown theoretical and philosophical approaches. In this sense, All Azimuth aims to transcend conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic and cultural boundaries. All submitted manuscripts are subject to initial evaluation by the Editor. If found suitable for further consideration, manuscripts will be assessed through double-blind peer-review by independent, anonymous experts. All Azimuth is published by the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research, a non-profit and nonpartisan organization dedicated to helping develop agendas and promote policies that contribute to the peaceful resolution of international and inter-communal conflicts taking place particularly in the regions surrounding Turkey.