{"title":"机构投资者话语权对冻结收购要约条款和结果的影响","authors":"Beni Lauterbach, Yevgeny Mugerman","doi":"10.1142/s2010139220500020","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study the impact of institutional investors' “voice” on 201 going private tender offers by controlling shareholders (\"freeze-out\" offers) in Israel. Israeli regulatory intervention in freeze-out tender offers is relatively mild, thus institutional investors’ activism becomes crucial. We find that institutional voice has dual effects. On one hand, when there are pre-negotiations with institutional investors’ (their voice is heard), accepted offers’ premiums increase. On the other hand, when institutional investors express their voice, yet reject the offer, these rejections appear to hurt shareholders’ value. We also document significant institutional investor exit after rejected offers, especially after offers preceded by voice (pre-negotiations with institutional investors).","PeriodicalId":45339,"journal":{"name":"Quarterly Journal of Finance","volume":"84 1","pages":"2050002"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2020-02-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Effect of Institutional Investors’ Voice on the Terms and Outcome of Freeze-out Tender Offers\",\"authors\":\"Beni Lauterbach, Yevgeny Mugerman\",\"doi\":\"10.1142/s2010139220500020\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study the impact of institutional investors' “voice” on 201 going private tender offers by controlling shareholders (\\\"freeze-out\\\" offers) in Israel. Israeli regulatory intervention in freeze-out tender offers is relatively mild, thus institutional investors’ activism becomes crucial. We find that institutional voice has dual effects. On one hand, when there are pre-negotiations with institutional investors’ (their voice is heard), accepted offers’ premiums increase. On the other hand, when institutional investors express their voice, yet reject the offer, these rejections appear to hurt shareholders’ value. We also document significant institutional investor exit after rejected offers, especially after offers preceded by voice (pre-negotiations with institutional investors).\",\"PeriodicalId\":45339,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Quarterly Journal of Finance\",\"volume\":\"84 1\",\"pages\":\"2050002\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-02-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Quarterly Journal of Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139220500020\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quarterly Journal of Finance","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1142/s2010139220500020","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Effect of Institutional Investors’ Voice on the Terms and Outcome of Freeze-out Tender Offers
We study the impact of institutional investors' “voice” on 201 going private tender offers by controlling shareholders ("freeze-out" offers) in Israel. Israeli regulatory intervention in freeze-out tender offers is relatively mild, thus institutional investors’ activism becomes crucial. We find that institutional voice has dual effects. On one hand, when there are pre-negotiations with institutional investors’ (their voice is heard), accepted offers’ premiums increase. On the other hand, when institutional investors express their voice, yet reject the offer, these rejections appear to hurt shareholders’ value. We also document significant institutional investor exit after rejected offers, especially after offers preceded by voice (pre-negotiations with institutional investors).
期刊介绍：
The Quarterly Journal of Finance publishes high-quality papers in all areas of finance, including corporate finance, asset pricing, financial econometrics, international finance, macro-finance, behavioral finance, banking and financial intermediation, capital markets, risk management and insurance, derivatives, quantitative finance, corporate governance and compensation, investments and entrepreneurial finance.
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