{"title":"一个可验证的、集中的、无强制的信誉系统","authors":"F. Kerschbaum","doi":"10.1145/1655188.1655197","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Reputation systems are popular tools to evaluate the trustworthiness of an unknown party before a transaction, but the reputation score can greatly impact the rated subject, such that it might be inclined to suppress negative ratings. In order to elicit coercion-resistant, honest feedback, this paper proposes a reputation system that provides complete privacy of the ratings, i.e. neither the ratee nor the reputation system will learn the value of the rating. We take both, a cryptographic as well as a non-cryptographic approach, to the problem. Privacy of ratings may foster bad mouthing attacks where an attacker leaves intentionally bad feedback. We limit the possibility for this attack by providing a token system such that one can only leave feedback after a transaction, and provide a cryptographic proof of the privacy of our system. We consider the Virtual Organization formation problem and develop and evaluate a novel reputation aggregation algorithm for it.","PeriodicalId":74537,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","volume":"26 1","pages":"61-70"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2009-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"52","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A verifiable, centralized, coercion-free reputation system\",\"authors\":\"F. Kerschbaum\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/1655188.1655197\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Reputation systems are popular tools to evaluate the trustworthiness of an unknown party before a transaction, but the reputation score can greatly impact the rated subject, such that it might be inclined to suppress negative ratings. In order to elicit coercion-resistant, honest feedback, this paper proposes a reputation system that provides complete privacy of the ratings, i.e. neither the ratee nor the reputation system will learn the value of the rating. We take both, a cryptographic as well as a non-cryptographic approach, to the problem. Privacy of ratings may foster bad mouthing attacks where an attacker leaves intentionally bad feedback. We limit the possibility for this attack by providing a token system such that one can only leave feedback after a transaction, and provide a cryptographic proof of the privacy of our system. We consider the Virtual Organization formation problem and develop and evaluate a novel reputation aggregation algorithm for it.\",\"PeriodicalId\":74537,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society\",\"volume\":\"26 1\",\"pages\":\"61-70\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2009-11-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"52\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/1655188.1655197\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1655188.1655197","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A verifiable, centralized, coercion-free reputation system
Reputation systems are popular tools to evaluate the trustworthiness of an unknown party before a transaction, but the reputation score can greatly impact the rated subject, such that it might be inclined to suppress negative ratings. In order to elicit coercion-resistant, honest feedback, this paper proposes a reputation system that provides complete privacy of the ratings, i.e. neither the ratee nor the reputation system will learn the value of the rating. We take both, a cryptographic as well as a non-cryptographic approach, to the problem. Privacy of ratings may foster bad mouthing attacks where an attacker leaves intentionally bad feedback. We limit the possibility for this attack by providing a token system such that one can only leave feedback after a transaction, and provide a cryptographic proof of the privacy of our system. We consider the Virtual Organization formation problem and develop and evaluate a novel reputation aggregation algorithm for it.