{"title":"梅奇所知:道德想象与道德思想的两种观念","authors":"Craig Taylor","doi":"10.1515/sats-2017-0007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract According to a widely held view, moral thought essentially involves the survey of an array of independently specifiable morally relevant facts, on the basis of which an agent is to reach a judgment about how anybody in that situation ought to act. I argue, drawing on Henry James’s What Maisie Knew, that one thing that such a view discounts is the role of imagination in moral thought, and specifically in contributing to what Iris Murdoch has called someone’s personal vision of life.","PeriodicalId":38824,"journal":{"name":"SATS","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"What Maisie Knew: Moral Imagination and Two Conceptions of Moral Thought\",\"authors\":\"Craig Taylor\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/sats-2017-0007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract According to a widely held view, moral thought essentially involves the survey of an array of independently specifiable morally relevant facts, on the basis of which an agent is to reach a judgment about how anybody in that situation ought to act. I argue, drawing on Henry James’s What Maisie Knew, that one thing that such a view discounts is the role of imagination in moral thought, and specifically in contributing to what Iris Murdoch has called someone’s personal vision of life.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38824,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"SATS\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-12-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"SATS\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/sats-2017-0007\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"SATS","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/sats-2017-0007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
What Maisie Knew: Moral Imagination and Two Conceptions of Moral Thought
Abstract According to a widely held view, moral thought essentially involves the survey of an array of independently specifiable morally relevant facts, on the basis of which an agent is to reach a judgment about how anybody in that situation ought to act. I argue, drawing on Henry James’s What Maisie Knew, that one thing that such a view discounts is the role of imagination in moral thought, and specifically in contributing to what Iris Murdoch has called someone’s personal vision of life.