{"title":"米尔斯海默:《现实主义与乌克兰战争","authors":"N. Smith, Grant Dawson","doi":"10.1515/auk-2022-2023","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The usefulness of ‘realism’ in explaining Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine has become a keenly contested debate not only in International Relations but in wider public intellectual discourse since the onset of the war in February 2022. At the centre of this debate is the punditry of John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent offensive realist who is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Chicago. This article argues that although Mearsheimer is indeed a realist, his offensive realism is but one of many different realist theories that can forward an explanation of the Ukraine War. Beyond the apparent hegemony of structural realism (the branch of realism to which Mearsheimer’s offensive realism belongs), it is argued that classical and neoclassical realist frameworks can provide more nuanced and, ultimately, convincing arguments as to why Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to invade Ukraine. This is because both classical and neoclassical realism can incorporate insights from non-realist studies—such as the concepts of civilization and ontological security—and combine them into an overarching power politics framework. Although neither classical nor neoclassical realism is flawless in their explanations, they demonstrate that realism does not just have to be about international power structures but can offer multivariate accounts of why a state, like Russia, decided to act, such as invading Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":35240,"journal":{"name":"Analyse und Kritik","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-08-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mearsheimer, Realism, and the Ukraine War\",\"authors\":\"N. Smith, Grant Dawson\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/auk-2022-2023\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract The usefulness of ‘realism’ in explaining Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine has become a keenly contested debate not only in International Relations but in wider public intellectual discourse since the onset of the war in February 2022. At the centre of this debate is the punditry of John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent offensive realist who is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Chicago. This article argues that although Mearsheimer is indeed a realist, his offensive realism is but one of many different realist theories that can forward an explanation of the Ukraine War. Beyond the apparent hegemony of structural realism (the branch of realism to which Mearsheimer’s offensive realism belongs), it is argued that classical and neoclassical realist frameworks can provide more nuanced and, ultimately, convincing arguments as to why Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to invade Ukraine. This is because both classical and neoclassical realism can incorporate insights from non-realist studies—such as the concepts of civilization and ontological security—and combine them into an overarching power politics framework. Although neither classical nor neoclassical realism is flawless in their explanations, they demonstrate that realism does not just have to be about international power structures but can offer multivariate accounts of why a state, like Russia, decided to act, such as invading Ukraine.\",\"PeriodicalId\":35240,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Analyse und Kritik\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-08-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Analyse und Kritik\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2022-2023\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Analyse und Kritik","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2022-2023","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
摘要
自2022年2月战争爆发以来,“现实主义”在解释俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的决定时的有用性,不仅在国际关系领域,而且在更广泛的公共知识分子话语中,都成为了一个激烈争论的话题。这场辩论的核心是约翰·j·米尔斯海默(John J. Mearsheimer)的权威观点,他是芝加哥大学(University of Chicago)国际关系教授,是一位著名的进攻性现实主义者。本文认为,虽然米尔斯海默确实是一位现实主义者,但他的进攻性现实主义理论只是解释乌克兰战争的众多现实主义理论之一。除了结构现实主义(Mearsheimer的进攻性现实主义属于现实主义的分支)的明显霸权之外,有人认为古典和新古典现实主义框架可以提供更细致入微的,最终令人信服的论据,说明俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔·普京(Vladimir Putin)为什么决定入侵乌克兰。这是因为古典现实主义和新古典现实主义都可以结合非现实主义研究的见解——比如文明和本体论安全的概念——并将它们结合到一个总体的权力政治框架中。尽管古典现实主义和新古典现实主义的解释都不完美,但他们证明,现实主义不仅必须是关于国际权力结构的,而且可以提供多元的解释,解释为什么像俄罗斯这样的国家决定采取行动,比如入侵乌克兰。
Abstract The usefulness of ‘realism’ in explaining Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine has become a keenly contested debate not only in International Relations but in wider public intellectual discourse since the onset of the war in February 2022. At the centre of this debate is the punditry of John J. Mearsheimer, a prominent offensive realist who is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Chicago. This article argues that although Mearsheimer is indeed a realist, his offensive realism is but one of many different realist theories that can forward an explanation of the Ukraine War. Beyond the apparent hegemony of structural realism (the branch of realism to which Mearsheimer’s offensive realism belongs), it is argued that classical and neoclassical realist frameworks can provide more nuanced and, ultimately, convincing arguments as to why Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to invade Ukraine. This is because both classical and neoclassical realism can incorporate insights from non-realist studies—such as the concepts of civilization and ontological security—and combine them into an overarching power politics framework. Although neither classical nor neoclassical realism is flawless in their explanations, they demonstrate that realism does not just have to be about international power structures but can offer multivariate accounts of why a state, like Russia, decided to act, such as invading Ukraine.