对监督的恐惧:商业型政府的根本失败

Steven L. Schooner
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引用次数: 36

摘要

本文讨论了《国家绩效评估》(National Performance Review,简称NPR)通过使政府更商业化来重塑政府的广泛努力,重点讨论了其在改革联邦采购流程方面的成功努力。这篇文章表明,改革后的体制大大增加了购买者的自由裁量权,同时大大减少了对政府支出的监督——无论是对内还是对外。这篇文章断言,这种组合侵蚀了公众对采购系统的信心,违反了既定的规范,并且与许多国会授权和政策背道而驰。更具体地说,本文提供了经验证据,证明在20世纪90年代,与政府合同有关的诉讼急剧持续减少。这篇文章表达了关注,因为这一趋势与两个重大变化相吻合:(1)国会授权大规模削减采购人员,这大大减少了内部监督;(2)全面的NPR重新发明倡议,这大大增加了购买者的自由裁量权。本文对诉讼减少的原因提供了一个暂定的解释清单。它断言,在这方面,诉讼- -由私人总检察长发起的一种外部监测形式- -是一种公益事业。与授予和履行政府合同有关的诉讼减少,威胁到公众对改革议程的信任。在这种情况下,诉讼当事人在追求自身利益的同时,也为公众利益服务。此外,由于内部监督减少,私营部门提供这种服务的需要也增加了。这篇文章表明,尽管采购改革取得了成功,但目前的范例提升了其表面上吸引人的准则- -效率和自由裁量权- -而牺牲了指导采购制度的其他既定但显然被低估的准则,例如透明度、廉正和竞争。报告警告说,商业作风的政府削弱了现有的内部和外部监督机制,威胁到公众对采购制度的持续信心。
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Fear of Oversight: The Fundamental Failure of Business-like Government
This article discusses the National Performance Review's (NPR's) broad-reaching effort to reinvent government by making it more businesslike, focusing on its successful effort to reform the Federal procurement process. The article shows that the reformed system couples greatly increased buyer discretion with dramatically reduced oversight of government spending - both internal and external. This article asserts that this combination erodes the public's confidence in the procurement system, violates established norms, and is antithetical to a host of Congressional mandates and policies. More particularly, the article provides empirical evidence of the dramatic, sustained reduction in government contract related litigation during the 1990's. The article expresses concern because the trend coincided with two significant changes: (1) a large-scale Congressionally-mandated reduction in acquisition personnel, which materially reduced internal oversight, and (2) the sweeping NPR re-invention initiatives, which considerably increased purchaser discretion. The article offers a provisional list of explanations for the decrease in litigation. It asserts that, in this context, litigation - a form of external monitoring initiated by private attorneys general - is a public good. Reduced litigation relating to the award and performance of the government's contracts threatens the public's trust in the reinvention agenda. Litigants, in this context, serve the public interest while pursuing their own self interest. Moreover, the need for the private sector to provide this service increases as internal oversight decreases. The article suggests that, despite the success of procurement reform, the current paradigm elevates its facially attractive norms - efficiency and discretion - at the expense of other established, yet apparently undervalued, norms that guide the procurement system, e.g., transparency, integrity, and competition. It cautions that businesslike government has diluted existing internal and external oversight mechanisms and threatened sustained public confidence in the procurement system.
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