分配问题中学习的公平算法

Hadi Elzayn, S. Jabbari, Christopher Jung, Michael Kearns, S. Neel, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman
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引用次数: 86

摘要

可以通过集中代理在几个群体中分配稀缺资源(例如贷款或警察)来模拟诸如贷款和警务之类的设置,以便最大化某些目标(例如偿还的贷款或逮捕的罪犯)。通常在这类问题中,公平也是一个值得关注的问题。基于机会平等的一般原则,公平的一个自然概念是,如果一个人是有关资源的候选人,那么实际获得该资源的概率大约与该个人所属的群体无关。例如,在贷款这将意味着同样有信誉的个体在不同种族有大致相等的机会获得贷款。在警务工作中,这意味着在不同地区犯下同样罪行的两个人被逮捕的几率大致相同。在本文中,我们形式化了分配问题公平性的一般概念,并研究了其算法结果。我们的主要技术成果包括一个有效的学习算法,即使分配者不知道每个组中候选人(即信誉良好的个人或罪犯)的频率,该算法也会收敛到最优公平分配。该算法在审查反馈模型中运行,在该模型中,只能观察到在给定分配中接收资源的候选人数量,而不是每组中候选人的真实数量。这就说明了这样一个事实:如果一个地区的警察人数很少,我们就无法了解那些我们不贷款的人的信用状况,也无法了解他们犯下的罪行。作为我们的框架和算法的应用,我们考虑了预测警务问题,其中分配给每个组的资源是分配给每个地区的警察数量。学习算法是根据前几天从自己的部署中收集的逮捕数据进行训练的,这导致了我们的算法可以克服的潜在反馈循环。在这种情况下,公平约束要求的概率一个犯了罪的人被逮捕应独立于他们所居住的地区。我们在费城犯罪事件数据集上研究了我们的学习算法的性能。
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Fair Algorithms for Learning in Allocation Problems
Settings such as lending and policing can be modeled by a centralized agent allocating a scarce resource (e.g. loans or police officers) amongst several groups, in order to maximize some objective (e.g. loans given that are repaid, or criminals that are apprehended). Often in such problems fairness is also a concern. One natural notion of fairness, based on general principles of equality of opportunity, asks that conditional on an individual being a candidate for the resource in question, the probability of actually receiving it is approximately independent of the individual's group. For example, in lending this would mean that equally creditworthy individuals in different racial groups have roughly equal chances of receiving a loan. In policing it would mean that two individuals committing the same crime in different districts would have roughly equal chances of being arrested. In this paper, we formalize this general notion of fairness for allocation problems and investigate its algorithmic consequences. Our main technical results include an efficient learning algorithm that converges to an optimal fair allocation even when the allocator does not know the frequency of candidates (i.e. creditworthy individuals or criminals) in each group. This algorithm operates in a censored feedback model in which only the number of candidates who received the resource in a given allocation can be observed, rather than the true number of candidates in each group. This models the fact that we do not learn the creditworthiness of individuals we do not give loans to and do not learn about crimes committed if the police presence in a district is low. As an application of our framework and algorithm, we consider the predictive policing problem, in which the resource being allocated to each group is the number of police officers assigned to each district. The learning algorithm is trained on arrest data gathered from its own deployments on previous days, resulting in a potential feedback loop that our algorithm provably overcomes. In this case, the fairness constraint asks that the probability that an individual who has committed a crime is arrested should be independent of the district in which they live. We investigate the performance of our learning algorithm on the Philadelphia Crime Incidents dataset.
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