{"title":"政治分裂与政府稳定:来自西班牙地方政府的证据","authors":"Felipe Carozzi, Davide Cipullo, Luca Repetto","doi":"10.1257/app.20200128","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by reducing the probability of a single-party majority and increasing the instability of governments when such a majority is not available. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. (JEL C78, D72, H70)","PeriodicalId":48212,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","volume":"28 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":5.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Political Fragmentation and Government Stability: Evidence from Local Governments in Spain\",\"authors\":\"Felipe Carozzi, Davide Cipullo, Luca Repetto\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/app.20200128\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by reducing the probability of a single-party majority and increasing the instability of governments when such a majority is not available. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. (JEL C78, D72, H70)\",\"PeriodicalId\":48212,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics\",\"volume\":\"28 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200128\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Journal-Applied Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20200128","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Political Fragmentation and Government Stability: Evidence from Local Governments in Spain
This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in the local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by reducing the probability of a single-party majority and increasing the instability of governments when such a majority is not available. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. (JEL C78, D72, H70)
期刊介绍:
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics publishes papers covering a range of topics in applied economics, with a focus on empirical microeconomic issues. In particular, we welcome papers on labor economics, development microeconomics, health, education, demography, empirical corporate finance, empirical studies of trade, and empirical behavioral economics.