法律限制、金融弱化和最后贷款人

Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance Cato Journal Pub Date : 1989-01-01 DOI:10.4324/9780203022948.ch10
G. Selgin
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引用次数: 43

摘要

为央行和法定货币辩护的一种流行说法是,央行和法定货币是为了保护支付系统免受金融危机的威胁。央行可以充当其他银行的“最后贷款人”,向储户保证,他们永远不必担心银行业的全面崩溃;法定货币反过来又保证了最后贷款人本身永远不会破产。“最后贷款人”观点背后的一个关键假设是,部分准备金制度本质上是“脆弱的”,容易发生危机——央行和法定货币是市场失灵不可避免的反应。根据Minsky (1982, p. 17)的说法,“有利于金融危机的条件出现在资本主义经济的正常运作中。”明斯基说,在自由市场中,这种情况偶尔会产生“广泛和蔓延的破产”,然而,“一个警惕的最后贷款人”可以防止这种破产(第13页)
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Legal Restrictions, Financial Weakening, and the Lender of Last Resort
A popular defense of central banks and fiat money claims that they are needed to protect the payments system against the peril of financial crises. A central bank can act as a “lender of last resort” to other banks, assuring depositors that they need never fear a general banking collapse; fiat money in turn guarantees that the lender of last resort itself will never go broke.’ A crucial assumption behind the lender of last resort argument is that fractional-reserve banking is inherently “fragile” and crisis prone—that central banking and fiat money are an unavoidable response tomarket failure. According to Minsky (1982, p. 17), “conditions conducive to financialcrises emerge from the normal functioning of a capitalist economy.” In a free market, says Minsky, such conditions will occasionally produce “wide and spreading bankruptcies” that could, however, be prevented by “an alert lender of last resort” (p. 13).2
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Cato Journal
Cato Journal Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
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