考虑客户排队和订单取消的按需平台定价与匹配

IF 1.1 4区 计算机科学 Q4 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS Infor Pub Date : 2022-02-15 DOI:10.1080/03155986.2022.2036034
Zhongmiao Sun, Qi Xu, Guoqing Zhang, Jinrong Liu
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在按需平台上排队可能会让一些客户产生反感而放弃使用,而已经确认订单的客户也可能因为一些不确定因素而取消订单,这给平台造成了一定的机会损失。本文考虑了顾客排队行为和取消订单行为,研究了利润最大化平台的最优定价与匹配问题。我们首先构建了无COC行为和有COC行为的模型(案例N和案例C),然后提出了平台处理COC行为的两种策略,包括惩罚策略(案例PC)和惩罚-补贴策略(案例PSC)。通过对这些模型的求解和分析,我们发现,虽然惩罚策略直观地阻止了一些客户使用按需服务,但由于罚款的原因,平台降低了服务价格,间接地鼓励了更多可能不会取消订单的客户请求服务。我们还发现,当COCR大于某一临界点时,惩罚策略和惩罚-补贴策略都是有利的,其中惩罚策略是最好的。然而,当COCR小于临界点时,惩罚策略是不利的,而惩罚-补贴策略是有利的。COC:客户排队和订单取消;COCR:客户订单取消率。
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Pricing and matching for on-demand platform considering customer queuing and order cancellation
Abstract Queuing on an on-demand platform may make some customers disgust and give up using it, and the customers who have confirmed the orders may also cancel the orders due to some uncertain factors, which causes certain opportunity loss to the platform. This article considers both customer queuing and order cancellation (COC) behaviour, and studies optimal pricing and matching of the profit-maximizing platform. We first construct models without and with COC behaviour (cases N and C), and then propose two strategies of the platform to deal with COC behaviour, including the penalty strategy (case PC) and the penalty-subsidy strategy (case PSC). By solving these models and analysing, we find that although the penalty strategy intuitively discourages some customers from using on-demand services, the platform reduces the service price because of penalty fee, which indirectly encourages more customers who may not cancel orders to request services. We also find that when the COCR is greater than a certain critical point, both the penalty strategy and penalty-subsidy strategy are advantageous, while the penalty strategy is the best. However, when the COCR is less than the critical point, the penalty strategy is unfavourable, while the penalty-subsidy strategy is advantageous. Abbreviations: COC: customer queuing and order cancellation; COCR: customer order cancellation rate.
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来源期刊
Infor
Infor 管理科学-计算机:信息系统
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
16
审稿时长
>12 weeks
期刊介绍: INFOR: Information Systems and Operational Research is published and sponsored by the Canadian Operational Research Society. It provides its readers with papers on a powerful combination of subjects: Information Systems and Operational Research. The importance of combining IS and OR in one journal is that both aim to expand quantitative scientific approaches to management. With this integration, the theory, methodology, and practice of OR and IS are thoroughly examined. INFOR is available in print and online.
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