A Better Approach

But maybe the relation between morality and epistemology runs in the opposite direction, and it is the range of our epistemic responsibility which constrains the range of our moral responsibility. Initially, this may seem like an unwelcome thought. To the contrary, this chapter argues that it can serve to empower victims of prejudice seeking redress. Moral responsibility is a multi-dimensional concept: while it is plausible that ascriptions of moral blame track ascriptions of epistemic responsibility, other forms of moral liability do not. Drawing on insights from tort law and discrimination law, this chapter argues that victims’ claims to have been wronged in no way depends on their ability to demonstrate that their victimizers were positioned to know that their actions were wrong. This frees victims of prejudice from the substantial burden of having to show that prejudiced believers are—universally, or in any specific case—epistemically irrational in believing as they do.