{"title":"会计准则的政治:评拉曼纳的《不可靠的账目:监管者如何编造概念叙事以传播批评》","authors":"Steve Vogel","doi":"10.1515/ael-2021-0088","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Karthik Ramanna recounts how the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) dropped “reliability” as a fundamental property of accounting in 2010. He offers two possible explanations for this change: (1) The FASB removed reliability to clarify its conceptual framework, and (2) It sought to reconcile its framework with the growing use of fair-value accounting. Ramanna does not give total victory to one explanation over another, nor does he assign purely public- or private-interest motives to the actors in the story. Yet this very ambiguity tells us a lot about the distinctive politics of accounting and other technical realms of regulation, and exposes some of the shortcomings of more standard interest-group models in political science.","PeriodicalId":43657,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","volume":"21 1","pages":"247 - 252"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Politics of Accounting Standards: A Comment on Ramanna’s “Unreliable Accounts: How Regulators Fabricate Conceptual Narratives to Diffuse Criticism”\",\"authors\":\"Steve Vogel\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/ael-2021-0088\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Karthik Ramanna recounts how the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) dropped “reliability” as a fundamental property of accounting in 2010. He offers two possible explanations for this change: (1) The FASB removed reliability to clarify its conceptual framework, and (2) It sought to reconcile its framework with the growing use of fair-value accounting. Ramanna does not give total victory to one explanation over another, nor does he assign purely public- or private-interest motives to the actors in the story. Yet this very ambiguity tells us a lot about the distinctive politics of accounting and other technical realms of regulation, and exposes some of the shortcomings of more standard interest-group models in political science.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43657,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium\",\"volume\":\"21 1\",\"pages\":\"247 - 252\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2021-0088\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Accounting Economics and Law-A Convivium","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2021-0088","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Politics of Accounting Standards: A Comment on Ramanna’s “Unreliable Accounts: How Regulators Fabricate Conceptual Narratives to Diffuse Criticism”
Abstract Karthik Ramanna recounts how the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) dropped “reliability” as a fundamental property of accounting in 2010. He offers two possible explanations for this change: (1) The FASB removed reliability to clarify its conceptual framework, and (2) It sought to reconcile its framework with the growing use of fair-value accounting. Ramanna does not give total victory to one explanation over another, nor does he assign purely public- or private-interest motives to the actors in the story. Yet this very ambiguity tells us a lot about the distinctive politics of accounting and other technical realms of regulation, and exposes some of the shortcomings of more standard interest-group models in political science.