会计准则的政治:评拉曼纳的《不可靠的账目:监管者如何编造概念叙事以传播批评》

Pub Date : 2022-01-31 DOI:10.1515/ael-2021-0088
Steve Vogel
{"title":"会计准则的政治:评拉曼纳的《不可靠的账目:监管者如何编造概念叙事以传播批评》","authors":"Steve Vogel","doi":"10.1515/ael-2021-0088","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Karthik Ramanna recounts how the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) dropped “reliability” as a fundamental property of accounting in 2010. He offers two possible explanations for this change: (1) The FASB removed reliability to clarify its conceptual framework, and (2) It sought to reconcile its framework with the growing use of fair-value accounting. Ramanna does not give total victory to one explanation over another, nor does he assign purely public- or private-interest motives to the actors in the story. Yet this very ambiguity tells us a lot about the distinctive politics of accounting and other technical realms of regulation, and exposes some of the shortcomings of more standard interest-group models in political science.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Politics of Accounting Standards: A Comment on Ramanna’s “Unreliable Accounts: How Regulators Fabricate Conceptual Narratives to Diffuse Criticism”\",\"authors\":\"Steve Vogel\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/ael-2021-0088\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Karthik Ramanna recounts how the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) dropped “reliability” as a fundamental property of accounting in 2010. He offers two possible explanations for this change: (1) The FASB removed reliability to clarify its conceptual framework, and (2) It sought to reconcile its framework with the growing use of fair-value accounting. Ramanna does not give total victory to one explanation over another, nor does he assign purely public- or private-interest motives to the actors in the story. Yet this very ambiguity tells us a lot about the distinctive politics of accounting and other technical realms of regulation, and exposes some of the shortcomings of more standard interest-group models in political science.\",\"PeriodicalId\":0,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2021-0088\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/ael-2021-0088","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

Karthik Ramanna叙述了财务会计准则委员会(FASB)如何在2010年放弃了“可靠性”作为会计的基本属性。他对这一变化提供了两种可能的解释:(1)FASB删除了可靠性以澄清其概念框架,(2)它试图使其框架与越来越多地使用公允价值会计相协调。拉曼纳并没有让一种解释凌驾于另一种解释之上,他也没有将故事中的演员纯粹的公共或私人利益动机赋予他们。然而,正是这种模糊性告诉了我们很多关于会计和其他监管技术领域的独特政治,并暴露了政治科学中更标准的利益集团模型的一些缺点。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
The Politics of Accounting Standards: A Comment on Ramanna’s “Unreliable Accounts: How Regulators Fabricate Conceptual Narratives to Diffuse Criticism”
Abstract Karthik Ramanna recounts how the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) dropped “reliability” as a fundamental property of accounting in 2010. He offers two possible explanations for this change: (1) The FASB removed reliability to clarify its conceptual framework, and (2) It sought to reconcile its framework with the growing use of fair-value accounting. Ramanna does not give total victory to one explanation over another, nor does he assign purely public- or private-interest motives to the actors in the story. Yet this very ambiguity tells us a lot about the distinctive politics of accounting and other technical realms of regulation, and exposes some of the shortcomings of more standard interest-group models in political science.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1