法院的好名声和坏名声:Garoupa和Ginsburg的司法名声:一个比较理论

IF 1.9 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW University of Chicago Law Review Pub Date : 2016-05-23 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2783433
Tracey E. George, G. Gulati
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引用次数: 1

摘要

努诺·加鲁帕(Nuno Garoupa)和汤姆·金斯伯格(Tom Ginsburg)出版了一本雄心勃勃的书,试图解释司法系统的巨大多样性,部分原因在于法院是如何设计的,以调动公众对司法机构的高度评价的力量。这本书认为,法官在法庭内外都非常关心自己的声誉。法院的设计是为了利用法官最大化其声誉的愿望,而法官现有的声誉存量可以影响他们所服务的法院的设计。我们发现这本书有很多值得喜欢的地方,从它引人入胜和雄心勃勃的积极主张,到它对全球比较案例研究的娴熟运用。然而,我们也对这个理论是否能够统一地联系在一起并完成分配给它的工作存在疑问。
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Courts of Good and Ill Repute: Garoupa and Ginsburg's Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg have published an ambitious book that seeks to account for the great diversity of judicial systems based, in part, on how courts are designed to marshal the power of a high public opinion of the judiciary. Judges, the book posits, care deeply about their reputations both inside and outside the courts. Courts are designed to capitalize on judges’ desire to maximize their reputation, and judges’ existing stock of reputation can affect the design of the courts which they serve. We find much to like in this book, ranging from its intriguing and ambitious positive claims to its masterful use of comparative case studies from around the globe. However, we also have questions about the ability of the theory to hang together in a unified manner and to do the work assigned to it.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
5.00%
发文量
2
期刊介绍: The University of Chicago Law Review is a quarterly journal of legal scholarship. Often cited in Supreme Court and other court opinions, as well as in other scholarly works, it is among the most influential journals in the field. Students have full responsibility for editing and publishing the Law Review; they also contribute original scholarship of their own. The Law Review"s editorial board selects all pieces for publication and, with the assistance of staff members, performs substantive and technical edits on each of these pieces prior to publication.
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