2017年评估索赔减少的高成本:溢价下降,代理成本上升

Matthew Schoenfeld
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文考虑了正在进行的阻止评估诉讼的努力的初步结果。自2016年8月特拉华州评估法规改革以来,Chancery在Clearwire和PetSmart等案件中发布了大量低于或低于合并价格的评估意见,同时通过重申Corwin的原则来加强信托诉讼。结果——正如人们所预料的那样,当成本提高、收益降低时——通过评估受到质疑的交易数量减少了:2017年上半年,受到质疑的交易数量下降了33%。那些成功倡导限制这种做法的人辩称,评估索赔会促使买家拒绝支付高价,从而降低交易溢价,从而损害未进行评估的股东。在他们看来,减少估价本应使溢价上升。但今年迄今为止,美国股票的平均目标溢价为22.4%,是近年来最低的。2017年第二季度的平均目标溢价为19.3%,是之前50个季度观察中最低的;到目前为止,2017年第三季度的失业率为19.6%,是第二低的。在并购溢价明显下降的情况下,控制权变更支出占交易价值的比例有所上升。当与其他表明代理人寻租行为的指标(如不同时期的目标溢价达到52周高点)相结合进行分析时,证据表明,价值从目标股东大量转移到出售ceo手中,这些ceo已经适应了一种环境,这种环境由于股东诉讼“检查”的削弱而变得更加宽松,而股东诉讼“检查”以前曾限制过这种行为。
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The High Cost of Fewer Appraisal Claims in 2017: Premia Down, Agency Costs Up
This Essay considers the preliminary results of an ongoing effort to discourage appraisal litigation. In the year since the August 2016 reforms to the Delaware appraisal statute, Chancery has issued a slew of at-or-below merger price appraisal opinions in cases such as Clearwire and PetSmart, while simultaneously pinioning fiduciary litigation by reiterating the principles of Corwin. The result — as one would expect when costs are raised and benefits are reduced — has been that fewer deals are being challenged via appraisal: In 1H 2017, the number of deals challenged fell by 33%. Those who successfully advocated for curbs on the practice had argued that appraisal claims lowered deal premia by incenting buyers to withhold top dollar, thereby hurting non-appraising shareholders. On their view, curtailment of appraisal should have sent premia upwards. But year to date the average U.S. target premium of 22.4% is the lowest of any year in recent history. The average target premium in 2Q 2017 of 19.3% was the single-lowest of the fifty prior quarterly observations; thus far, 3Q 2017, at 19.6%, is tracking as the second-lowest. Amid the pronounced decline in merger premia, change-in-control payouts have expanded as a percentage of transaction value. When analyzed in concert with other measures indicative of agent rent-seeking — such as target premium to 52-week high over varying periods — the evidence points to a substantial transfer of value from target shareholders to selling CEOs, who have adapted to an environment rendered more permissive by the weakening of the shareholder litigation ‘check’ that had formerly restrained such behavior.
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