Special Issue Introduction

Today we talk about postpositivism. But which positivism is it that postpositivism would leave behind? It would appear to be the neopositivism or logical positivism of the Vienna Circle more than the positivism of Auguste Comte. This way of considering positivism is emblematic of a certain bias: the history of French philosophy of science has been relatively neglected compared to that of Central Europe. Some great figures, such as Pierre Duhem or Henri Poincaré, are taken into consideration, but they are most often treated as if their philosophy were entirely their own creation, much like Athena springing from the head of Zeus. The reality is different: Duhem’s and Poincaré’s thought, each in their own way, has historical roots in the original positivism of Auguste Comte. There is a certain irony to this neglect of the Comtean tradition. While the Vienna Circle logical positivists borrowed half of their name from it, they were hardly interested in studying the source of this philosophy. This relative lack of interest in the development of positivist ideas in France is somewhat paradoxical if we consider, for example, the political dimension that scholars of Vienna Circle have claimed in the thought of Rudolf Carnap,OttoNeurath,HansHahn, and Philip Frank. Such allegations are controversial: even though logical positivists may have had a political agenda, its connection with their philosophy of science is