思想选择中群体智慧的局限性

Felipe A. Csaszar
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引用次数: 15

摘要

关于开放式创新和众包的文献已经记录了“群体智慧”被用来做出传统上由最高管理层单独做出的决策的案例。这些文献主要关注群体产生想法的能力,但对群体选择想法的能力知之甚少。为了研究企业中基于群体的思想选择问题,本文建立了以多数投票方式决策的群体的数学模型。该模型考虑了对公司特别重要的偶然性,即:从人群中抽取的人群的规模,人群成员之间的准确性分布,以及公司招募人群中最准确个人的能力。结果表明:(1)在相对常见的条件下,增加人群规模实际上可能会降低性能;(ii)与达到最佳性能所需的人数相比,较少的人数通常可以达到接近最佳性能;(iii)确定最佳人群规模主要取决于公司招募“准确”个人的能力;(iv)良好的表现不需要大量的人群,除非所有的群体成员都表现出低水平的准确性。
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Limits to the Wisdom of the Crowd in Idea Selection
The literatures on open innovation and crowdsourcing have documented cases of the "wisdom of the crowd" being used to make decisions traditionally made by the top management alone. These literatures focus mainly on the capacity of crowds to generate ideas, but much less is known about a crowd's capacity to select ideas. To study crowd-based idea selection in firms, this paper develops a mathematical model of a crowd that makes decisions by majority voting. The model takes into account contingencies that are of particular importance to firms, namely: the size of the population from which the crowd is drawn, the distribution of accuracy among members of the population, and the firm's ability to recruit the population's most accurate individuals. The results show that: (i) under relatively common conditions, increasing the size of the crowd may actually reduce performance; (ii) near-optimal performance can usually be achieved by a much smaller crowd than the one required to achieve optimal performance; (iii) determining the best crowd size depends critically on the firm's ability to recruit "accurate" individuals; and (iv) good performance does not require large crowds unless all population members exhibit low levels of accuracy.
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