{"title":"欧盟整体豁免和横向研发协议","authors":"Derek J. Clark, Anita Michalsen, L. Olsen","doi":"10.1080/13571516.2020.1823188","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We analyze the effect of the European Union Competition Authority’s block exemption towards R&D cooperatives in a horizontal market structure, valid as long as the combined product market share is not too large. Two less efficient firms attempt to catch up with a technological leader, and may use the safe harbour provided by the legislation. We consider when the incentives of the R&D-performing firms are aligned with those of consumers, and when increases in the market share limit improves welfare. We show that an effective policy within this framework might be elusive. The market share restriction must be set in order that it is optimal for firms to use the safe harbour, and that this leads to more R&D than under competition. Even in this case, further increases in the market share restriction can harm welfare. This has widespread implications for how the EU Competition authority should respond to calls for an increase in the market share restriction.","PeriodicalId":45470,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Economics of Business","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The EU Block Exemption and Horizontal R&D Agreements\",\"authors\":\"Derek J. Clark, Anita Michalsen, L. Olsen\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/13571516.2020.1823188\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract We analyze the effect of the European Union Competition Authority’s block exemption towards R&D cooperatives in a horizontal market structure, valid as long as the combined product market share is not too large. Two less efficient firms attempt to catch up with a technological leader, and may use the safe harbour provided by the legislation. We consider when the incentives of the R&D-performing firms are aligned with those of consumers, and when increases in the market share limit improves welfare. We show that an effective policy within this framework might be elusive. The market share restriction must be set in order that it is optimal for firms to use the safe harbour, and that this leads to more R&D than under competition. Even in this case, further increases in the market share restriction can harm welfare. This has widespread implications for how the EU Competition authority should respond to calls for an increase in the market share restriction.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45470,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of the Economics of Business\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-05-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of the Economics of Business\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13571516.2020.1823188\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of the Economics of Business","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13571516.2020.1823188","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
The EU Block Exemption and Horizontal R&D Agreements
Abstract We analyze the effect of the European Union Competition Authority’s block exemption towards R&D cooperatives in a horizontal market structure, valid as long as the combined product market share is not too large. Two less efficient firms attempt to catch up with a technological leader, and may use the safe harbour provided by the legislation. We consider when the incentives of the R&D-performing firms are aligned with those of consumers, and when increases in the market share limit improves welfare. We show that an effective policy within this framework might be elusive. The market share restriction must be set in order that it is optimal for firms to use the safe harbour, and that this leads to more R&D than under competition. Even in this case, further increases in the market share restriction can harm welfare. This has widespread implications for how the EU Competition authority should respond to calls for an increase in the market share restriction.
期刊介绍:
International Journal of the Economics of Business presents original, peer reviewed research in economics that is clearly applicable to business or related public policy problems or issues. The term "business" is used in its widest sense to encompass both public and private sector—governmental, private non-profit and cooperative organizations, as well as profit-seeking enterprises. International Journal of the Economics of Business carries papers relating to three main spheres: The organization—to analyse and aid decision making and the internal organization of the business; The industry—to analyse how businesses interact and evolve within and across industries.