基于截止日期感知的云资源分配的真实在线拍卖机制

Tianrong Zhang, Yufeng Xin
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引用次数: 2

摘要

基于拍卖的资源分配和定价机制吸引了大量研究兴趣,以提高云平台的效用收益和公平性。云资源拍卖设计中尚未完全解决的一个基本问题是,当必须在线做出分配决策时,如何确保应用程序的及时执行。由于应用程序请求在资源需求和执行需求方面通常是异构的,因此增加了设计真实有效机制的复杂性。在本文中,我们提出了一种新的基于截止日期感知的云平台多资源分配的在线组合拍卖机制,该机制既实现了策略验证性,又实现了近似的社会福利效率。
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A truthful online auction mechanism for deadline-aware cloud resource allocation
Auction-based resource allocation and pricing mechanisms have attracted substantial research interests to enhance the utility gain and fairness of cloud platforms. A fundamental problem in cloud resource auction design that has not been fully addressed is how to ensure the timely execution of applications while allocation decisions have to be made online. Adding to the complexity of designing a truthful and efficient mechanism is that application requests are normally heterogeneous in resource demand and execution requirement. In this paper, we present a novel online combinatorial auction mechanism for deadline- aware multi-resource allocation for cloud platforms, which achieves both strategy-proofness and approximate efficiency on social welfare.
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