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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文介绍了现代临床精神病学和精神病学哲学中用于定义和描述妄想和妄想观念的主要概念。对他们进行了分析和比较,指出了精神病学和哲学对妄想的理解的主要差异。事实证明,现代临床精神病学认为妄想思想难以理解,因此认为它们纯粹是精神障碍的一种症状。作者建议重新考虑这种方法,并将重点放在对妄想的解释、赋予其意义和寻找分析方法上。作者确定了在解释一个没有精神障碍的人的妄想的过程中出现的困难。强调了精神健康的人和患有精神障碍的人在描绘世界图景方面的根本区别。论证了精神病学哲学中关于如何理解妄想症判断的假设。其中一种假设,即“谬论”立场,认为妄想性判断是虚假陈述的一种特殊情况,并建议应以与任何其他错误判断相同的方式对其进行分析。另一个假说是对病理经历的反应,它认为妄想性判断是对独特病理经历的反应。妄想的想法出现在试图解释这些经历的过程中,这种方法可以更好地理解妄想判断的机制。还提出了一种解释妄想的理性主义方法,该方法假设病理变化发生在比直接感知更高的水平上。这种方法是基于对妄想症陈述本身的分析,试图找出病人态度可能发生的变化。根据理性主义的方法,精神病患者观念的改变是他们对自己和世界的态度的结果,这为妄想的可能出现奠定了基础。根据理性主义的方法,妄想症的想法是不评估其真实性或虚假性的,因为它们是在任何可能的经验之外。因此,理性主义的方法使我们能够理解病人的信念是什么导致了他或她的妄想。可以确定的是,所描述的方法改变了将妄想视为精神疾病的征兆或症状的看法,并且没有忽视其在解释精神障碍方面的自身内容。精神病学的哲学理解妄想话语被构建为一个可以被描述和应该被研究的领域的空间。
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DELUSION: POSSIBILITIES FOR ANALYSIS
The article presents the main concepts for defining and describing delusions and delusional ideas used in modern clinical psychiatry and philosophy of psychiatry. Their analysis and comparison are carried out, the main differences in the psychiatric and philosophical understanding of delusions are indicated. It is demonstrated that modern clinical psychiatry considers delusional ideas inaccessible to understanding, and therefore considers them purely as a symptom of mental disorder. The author proposes to reconsider this approach and focus on interpreting delusions, giving them meaning, and finding methods for their analysis. The author identifies the difficulties that arise in the process of interpreting delusions by a person who does not suffer from a mental disorder. The fundamental difference in building a picture of the world in mentally healthy people and people suffering from mental disorders is emphasised. The hypotheses put forward in the philosophy of psychiatry on how to understand delusional judgements are demonstrated. One of the hypotheses, the "doxastic" position, considers delusional judgements to be a special case of false statements and suggests that they should be analysed in the same way as any other false judgement. Another hypothesis, the reaction to pathological experience, suggests that delusional judgements are a reaction to a unique pathological experience. Delusional ideas arise in an attempt to explain these experiences, and this approach allows for a greater understanding of the mechanisms underlying delusional judgements. A rationalist approach to the interpretation of delusions is also presented, which assumes that pathological changes occur at a higher level than direct perceptions. This approach is based on the analysis of the delusional statements themselves, trying to find out what the changes in the patient's attitudes may be. According to the rationalist approach, the altered ideas of a mentally ill person are a consequence of their attitudes towards themselves and the world, and this is what sets the stage for the possible emergence of delusions. According to the rationalist approach, delusional ideas are not evaluated for their truth or falsity, as they are outside of any possible experience. Therefore, the rationalist approach allows us to understand what the patient's beliefs are that caused his or her delusions. It is determined that the described approaches change the perception of delusions as a sign or symptom of mental illness and do not ignore its own content in explaining mental disorder. The philosophy of psychiatry understands the space in which delusional discourse is constructed as a sphere that can be described and should be studied.
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