SymCerts:用于暴露X.509证书验证实现中的不合规的实用符号执行

Sze Yiu Chau, Omar Chowdhury, Md. Endadul Hoque, Huangyi Ge, Aniket Kate, C. Nita-Rotaru, Ninghui Li
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引用次数: 48

摘要

长期以来,X.509公钥基础设施一直用于SSL/TLS协议中以实现身份验证。最近物联网(IoT)系统采用小足迹SSL/TLS库进行安全通信的趋势进一步推动了其突出地位。X.509提供的安全保证依赖于底层实现严格审查X.509证书链并只接受有效证书链的假设。不兼容的X.509实现可能会导致攻击和/或互操作性问题。在文献中,黑盒模糊测试已被用于发现X.509验证实现中的缺陷,然而,模糊测试不能保证覆盖范围,因此严重的缺陷可能仍未被检测到。为了彻底分析小内存占用SSL/TLS库中的X.509实现,本文采用了使用符号执行的补充方法。我们观察到符号执行,一种被证明在发现软件实现缺陷方面是有效的技术,也可以被用来暴露X.509实现中的不遵从性。然而,由于路径爆炸的问题,直接在SSL/TLS库上应用现成的符号执行引擎是不实际的。为此,我们建议使用SymCerts,它是精心构建的X.509证书链,混合了符号值和具体值。利用SymCerts和一些特定于域的优化,我们象征性地执行每个库的证书链验证代码,并提取描述其接受和拒绝证书宇宙的路径约束。这些路径约束帮助我们识别不同库中缺失的检查。为了暴露与X.509标准的微妙但复杂的不一致性,我们交叉验证从不同库中提取的约束,以发现进一步的实现缺陷。我们对9个小的X.509实现的分析发现了48个不符合的实例。我们提供的发现和建议已经被开发人员纳入到他们的库的新版本中。
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SymCerts: Practical Symbolic Execution for Exposing Noncompliance in X.509 Certificate Validation Implementations
The X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure has long been used in the SSL/TLS protocol to achieve authentication. A recent trend of Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems employing small footprint SSL/TLS libraries for secure communication has further propelled its prominence. The security guarantees provided by X.509 hinge on the assumption that the underlying implementation rigorously scrutinizes X.509 certificate chains, and accepts only the valid ones. Noncompliant implementations of X.509 can potentially lead to attacks and/or interoperability issues. In the literature, black-box fuzzing has been used to find flaws in X.509 validation implementations, fuzzing, however, cannot guarantee coverage and thus severe flaws may remain undetected. To thoroughly analyze X.509 implementations in small footprint SSL/TLS libraries, this paper takes the complementary approach of using symbolic execution. We observe that symbolic execution, a technique proven to be effective in finding software implementation flaws, can also be leveraged to expose noncompliance in X.509 implementations. Directly applying an off-the-shelf symbolic execution engine on SSL/TLS libraries is, however, not practical due to the problem of path explosion. To this end, we propose the use of SymCerts, which are X.509 certificate chains carefully constructed with a mixture of symbolic and concrete values. Utilizing SymCerts and some domain-specific optimizations, we symbolically execute the certificate chain validation code of each library and extract path constraints describing its accepting and rejecting certificate universes. These path constraints help us identify missing checks in different libraries. For exposing subtle but intricate noncompliance with X.509 standard, we cross-validate the constraints extracted from different libraries to find further implementation flaws. Our analysis of 9 small footprint X.509 implementations has uncovered 48 instances of noncompliance. Findings and suggestions provided by us have already been incorporated by developers into newer versions of their libraries.
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