{"title":"道德价值形而上学与道德美","authors":"M. Otte","doi":"10.1353/QUD.2016.0003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"to make little sense. Von Hildebrandian values contrast in fundamental ways with Scholastic theories of the good and beautiful. For von Hildebrand, beauty and good are not transcendentals that are coextensive with being. Rather, being is rendered beautiful or good by values: properties that remain distinct from “neutral” being as such.1 Nevertheless, there is ground for substantial movement towards synthesizing these traditions. Von Hildebrand’s description of values bears strong resemblance with a centerpiece of Scholastic phi-","PeriodicalId":40384,"journal":{"name":"Quaestiones Disputatae","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2016-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Metaphysics of Moral Values and Moral Beauty\",\"authors\":\"M. Otte\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/QUD.2016.0003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"to make little sense. Von Hildebrandian values contrast in fundamental ways with Scholastic theories of the good and beautiful. For von Hildebrand, beauty and good are not transcendentals that are coextensive with being. Rather, being is rendered beautiful or good by values: properties that remain distinct from “neutral” being as such.1 Nevertheless, there is ground for substantial movement towards synthesizing these traditions. Von Hildebrand’s description of values bears strong resemblance with a centerpiece of Scholastic phi-\",\"PeriodicalId\":40384,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Quaestiones Disputatae\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Quaestiones Disputatae\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0003\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"HUMANITIES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Quaestiones Disputatae","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/QUD.2016.0003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"HUMANITIES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY","Score":null,"Total":0}
to make little sense. Von Hildebrandian values contrast in fundamental ways with Scholastic theories of the good and beautiful. For von Hildebrand, beauty and good are not transcendentals that are coextensive with being. Rather, being is rendered beautiful or good by values: properties that remain distinct from “neutral” being as such.1 Nevertheless, there is ground for substantial movement towards synthesizing these traditions. Von Hildebrand’s description of values bears strong resemblance with a centerpiece of Scholastic phi-