Hashing to G2 on BLS pairing-friendly curves

When a pairing e : G₁ x G₂ → G_T, on an elliptic curve E defined over F_q, is exploited in a cryptographic protocol, there is often the need to hash binary strings into G₁ and G₂. Traditionally, if E admits a twist Ẽ of order d, then G₁ = E(F_q)⋂E[r], where r is a prime integer, and G₂ = Ẽ(F_q^k/d)⋂Ẽ[r], where k is the embedding degree of E w.r.t. r. The standard approach for hashing a binary string into G₁ and G₂ is to map it to general points P∈E(F_q) and P′ ∈ Ẽ(F_q^k/d), and then multiply them by the cofactors c = #E(F_q)/r and c′ = #Ẽ(F_q^k/d)/r respectively. Usually, the multiplication by c′ is computationally expensive. In order to speed up such a computation, two different methods (by Scott et al. and by Fuentes et al.) have been proposed. In this poster we consider these two methods for BLS pairing-friendly curves having k ∈ {12, 24, 30, 42,48}, providing efficiency comparisons. When k = 42,48, the Fuentes et al. method requires an expensive one-off pre-computation which was infeasible for the computational power at our disposal. In these cases, we theoretically obtain hashing maps that follow Fuentes et al. idea.