{"title":"经过验证的TLS加密实现","authors":"K. Bhargavan, C. Fournet, R. Corin, E. Zalinescu","doi":"10.1145/2133375.2133378","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We narrow the gap between concrete implementations of cryptographic protocols and their verified models. We develop and verify a small functional implementation of the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS 1.0). We make use of the same executable code for interoperability testing against mainstream implementations for automated symbolic cryptographic verification and automated computational cryptographic verification. We rely on a combination of recent tools and also develop a new tool for extracting computational models from executable code. We obtain strong security guarantees for TLS as used in typical deployments.","PeriodicalId":50912,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","volume":"30 1","pages":"3:1-3:32"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"38","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Verified Cryptographic Implementations for TLS\",\"authors\":\"K. Bhargavan, C. Fournet, R. Corin, E. Zalinescu\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2133375.2133378\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We narrow the gap between concrete implementations of cryptographic protocols and their verified models. We develop and verify a small functional implementation of the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS 1.0). We make use of the same executable code for interoperability testing against mainstream implementations for automated symbolic cryptographic verification and automated computational cryptographic verification. We rely on a combination of recent tools and also develop a new tool for extracting computational models from executable code. We obtain strong security guarantees for TLS as used in typical deployments.\",\"PeriodicalId\":50912,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security\",\"volume\":\"30 1\",\"pages\":\"3:1-3:32\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-03-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"38\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2133375.2133378\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q\",\"JCRName\":\"Engineering\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM Transactions on Information and System Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2133375.2133378","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q","JCRName":"Engineering","Score":null,"Total":0}
We narrow the gap between concrete implementations of cryptographic protocols and their verified models. We develop and verify a small functional implementation of the Transport Layer Security protocol (TLS 1.0). We make use of the same executable code for interoperability testing against mainstream implementations for automated symbolic cryptographic verification and automated computational cryptographic verification. We rely on a combination of recent tools and also develop a new tool for extracting computational models from executable code. We obtain strong security guarantees for TLS as used in typical deployments.
期刊介绍:
ISSEC is a scholarly, scientific journal that publishes original research papers in all areas of information and system security, including technologies, systems, applications, and policies.