{"title":"改进的资源分配设计规则","authors":"P. Shabalin, Bernd Laqua, A. Pikovsky","doi":"10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.110","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Iterative combinatorial auctions (ICA) have been getting raising attention both from researchers and in practice as they can increase efficiency of complex markets with substitute or complement valuations. This paper suggests several improvements for such auctions. We analyze the impact of these rules along several performance measurements using numerical experiments under various value models. Based on these experiments we select successful rules and consider their possible combinations.","PeriodicalId":58336,"journal":{"name":"电子商务评论","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Improved Rules for the Resource Allocation Design\",\"authors\":\"P. Shabalin, Bernd Laqua, A. Pikovsky\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.110\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Iterative combinatorial auctions (ICA) have been getting raising attention both from researchers and in practice as they can increase efficiency of complex markets with substitute or complement valuations. This paper suggests several improvements for such auctions. We analyze the impact of these rules along several performance measurements using numerical experiments under various value models. Based on these experiments we select successful rules and consider their possible combinations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":58336,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"电子商务评论\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2007-07-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"电子商务评论\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.110\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"电子商务评论","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC-EEE.2007.110","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Iterative combinatorial auctions (ICA) have been getting raising attention both from researchers and in practice as they can increase efficiency of complex markets with substitute or complement valuations. This paper suggests several improvements for such auctions. We analyze the impact of these rules along several performance measurements using numerical experiments under various value models. Based on these experiments we select successful rules and consider their possible combinations.
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