代理人动机和委托人预期:非单调性、意图和其他因素

Timothy Flannery, S. Roberts
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要我们设计了一个实验来测试是什么激励代理人选择更高的努力,以及委托人对代理人反应的预期程度。委托人对五个合同进行排名,排名越高,合同执行的可能性越大。在一种治疗中,这些排名对代理人是隐藏的;在另一种情况下,座席查看排名。代理人对合同结构和货币激励的反应在很大程度上符合我们的预测:代理人表现出对单调合同的偏好,而不是非单调合同,绝大多数人对高努力是最佳反应的合同做出了积极的反应。令人惊讶的是,提供一个完全补偿代理努力的扁平合同并不比什么都不提供更好。然而,不管排名的可观察性如何,委托人对代理人对合同的反应的预期都很差。此外,尽管可观察排名的差异只会对代理人行为产生较小的影响,但两种处理之间的委托人排名表明,委托人认为不同的排名会在可观察时显著影响代理人。
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Agent Motivation and Principal Anticipation: Non-Monotonicity, Intentions, and Other Factors
Abstract We design an experiment to test what motivates agents to choose higher effort and how well principals anticipate agent responses. Principals rank five contracts where a higher ranking increases the likelihood of a contract's implementation. In one treatment, those rankings remain hidden from agents; in the other, agents view the rankings. Agent response to contract structure and monetary incentives largely conforms to our predictions: agents demonstrate a preference for monotonic contracts over non-monotonic contracts, and the vast majority responds favorably to contracts where high effort is a best response. Surprisingly, offering a flat contract that exactly compensates agents for effort performs no better than offering nothing. Principals, however, poorly anticipate agent response to contracts, regardless of the observability of rankings. Additionally, although differences in observable rankings only affect agent behavior in minor ways, principals' rankings between the two treatments indicate principals believed different rankings would significantly influence agents when observable.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
8.30%
发文量
9
期刊介绍: International Journal of the Economics of Business presents original, peer reviewed research in economics that is clearly applicable to business or related public policy problems or issues. The term "business" is used in its widest sense to encompass both public and private sector—governmental, private non-profit and cooperative organizations, as well as profit-seeking enterprises. International Journal of the Economics of Business carries papers relating to three main spheres: The organization—to analyse and aid decision making and the internal organization of the business; The industry—to analyse how businesses interact and evolve within and across industries.
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