{"title":"认知研究的计算基础","authors":"D. Chalmers","doi":"10.17791/jcs.2011.12.4.325","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation requires analysis of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and concrete physical systems. I give such an analysis, based on the idea that a system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. This account can be used to justify the central commitments of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science: the thesis of computational sufficiency, which holds that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and the thesis of computational explanation, which holds that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. The theses are consequences of the facts that (a) computation can specify general patterns of causal organization, and (b) mentality is an organizational invariant, rooted in such patterns. Along the way I answer various challenges to the computationalist position, such as those put forward by Searle. I close by advocating a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind. This allows computation to serve as a true foundation for cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":43246,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Science","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"200","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition\",\"authors\":\"D. Chalmers\",\"doi\":\"10.17791/jcs.2011.12.4.325\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation requires analysis of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and concrete physical systems. I give such an analysis, based on the idea that a system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. This account can be used to justify the central commitments of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science: the thesis of computational sufficiency, which holds that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and the thesis of computational explanation, which holds that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. The theses are consequences of the facts that (a) computation can specify general patterns of causal organization, and (b) mentality is an organizational invariant, rooted in such patterns. Along the way I answer various challenges to the computationalist position, such as those put forward by Searle. I close by advocating a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind. 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A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition
Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation requires analysis of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and concrete physical systems. I give such an analysis, based on the idea that a system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. This account can be used to justify the central commitments of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science: the thesis of computational sufficiency, which holds that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and the thesis of computational explanation, which holds that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. The theses are consequences of the facts that (a) computation can specify general patterns of causal organization, and (b) mentality is an organizational invariant, rooted in such patterns. Along the way I answer various challenges to the computationalist position, such as those put forward by Searle. I close by advocating a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind. This allows computation to serve as a true foundation for cognitive science.
期刊介绍:
Journal of Cognitive Science is an official journal of the International Association for Cognitive Science (IACS, http://ia-cs.org) and published quarterly by the Institute for Cognitive Science at Seoul National University, located in Seoul, Korea. The Association currently consists of member societies of different countries such as Australia, China, Japan, Korea, and European Union. However, paper submission by anyone in the whole world is welcome at any time. Its main concern is to showcase research articles of highest quality and significance within the disciplines of cognitive science, including, but not limited to, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, aesthetics, anthropology, and education, insofar as it is deemed to be of interest to those who pursue the study of mind. In particular, we would like to encourage submissions that cross the traditional disciplinary boundaries. The Journal of Cognitive Science (JCS) is published quarterly on 31 March, 30 June, 30 September, 31 December (founded in 2000) as the official journal of International Association for Cognitive Science (IACS) by the Institute for Cognitive Science at Seoul National University. It is a SCOPUS, ESCI, EBSCO, KCI journal. It aims to publish research articles of the highest quality and significance within the disciplines that form cognitive science, including philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, anthropology, and education for Interdisciplinary Journal. Submissions that cross traditional disciplinary boundaries in either themes or methods are especially encouraged. AI-associated Cognitive Science will be newly reinforced and papers in this area are encouraged to be submitted.