认知研究的计算基础

IF 0.2 Q4 LINGUISTICS Journal of Cognitive Science Pub Date : 2011-12-01 DOI:10.17791/jcs.2011.12.4.325
D. Chalmers
{"title":"认知研究的计算基础","authors":"D. Chalmers","doi":"10.17791/jcs.2011.12.4.325","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation requires analysis of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and concrete physical systems. I give such an analysis, based on the idea that a system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. This account can be used to justify the central commitments of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science: the thesis of computational sufficiency, which holds that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and the thesis of computational explanation, which holds that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. The theses are consequences of the facts that (a) computation can specify general patterns of causal organization, and (b) mentality is an organizational invariant, rooted in such patterns. Along the way I answer various challenges to the computationalist position, such as those put forward by Searle. I close by advocating a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind. This allows computation to serve as a true foundation for cognitive science.","PeriodicalId":43246,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Cognitive Science","volume":"4 1","pages":"325-359"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2011-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"200","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition\",\"authors\":\"D. Chalmers\",\"doi\":\"10.17791/jcs.2011.12.4.325\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation requires analysis of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and concrete physical systems. I give such an analysis, based on the idea that a system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. This account can be used to justify the central commitments of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science: the thesis of computational sufficiency, which holds that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and the thesis of computational explanation, which holds that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. The theses are consequences of the facts that (a) computation can specify general patterns of causal organization, and (b) mentality is an organizational invariant, rooted in such patterns. Along the way I answer various challenges to the computationalist position, such as those put forward by Searle. I close by advocating a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind. This allows computation to serve as a true foundation for cognitive science.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43246,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Cognitive Science\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"325-359\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"200\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Cognitive Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.17791/jcs.2011.12.4.325\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"LINGUISTICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Cognitive Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.17791/jcs.2011.12.4.325","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"LINGUISTICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 200

摘要

计算是现代认知科学基础的核心,但它的作用是有争议的。关于计算的问题比比皆是:物理系统实现计算是什么?计算对思考来说足够了吗?计算在认知理论中的作用是什么?不同类型的计算理论之间的关系是什么,比如联结主义和符号计算?在本文中,我开发了一个系统的框架来解决所有这些问题。证明计算的作用需要分析实现,抽象计算和具体物理系统之间的联系。如果系统的因果结构反映了计算的形式结构,那么我基于这样的想法给出了这样的分析。这种解释可以用来证明人工智能和计算认知科学的核心承诺:计算充分性的论点,它认为正确的计算结构足以拥有思维,以及计算解释的论点,它认为计算为解释认知过程提供了一个总体框架。这些结论是以下事实的结果:(a)计算可以指定因果组织的一般模式,(b)心态是组织的不变量,植根于这种模式。在此过程中,我回答了对计算主义立场的各种挑战,例如Searle提出的挑战。最后,我提倡一种最小计算主义,与各种各样的思维经验方法相兼容。这使得计算成为认知科学的真正基础。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition
Computation is central to the foundations of modern cognitive science, but its role is controversial. Questions about computation abound: What is it for a physical system to implement a computation? Is computation sufficient for thought? What is the role of computation in a theory of cognition? What is the relation between different sorts of computational theory, such as connectionism and symbolic computation? In this paper I develop a systematic framework that addresses all of these questions. Justifying the role of computation requires analysis of implementation, the nexus between abstract computations and concrete physical systems. I give such an analysis, based on the idea that a system implements a computation if the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation. This account can be used to justify the central commitments of artificial intelligence and computational cognitive science: the thesis of computational sufficiency, which holds that the right kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and the thesis of computational explanation, which holds that computation provides a general framework for the explanation of cognitive processes. The theses are consequences of the facts that (a) computation can specify general patterns of causal organization, and (b) mentality is an organizational invariant, rooted in such patterns. Along the way I answer various challenges to the computationalist position, such as those put forward by Searle. I close by advocating a kind of minimal computationalism, compatible with a very wide variety of empirical approaches to the mind. This allows computation to serve as a true foundation for cognitive science.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: Journal of Cognitive Science is an official journal of the International Association for Cognitive Science (IACS, http://ia-cs.org) and published quarterly by the Institute for Cognitive Science at Seoul National University, located in Seoul, Korea. The Association currently consists of member societies of different countries such as Australia, China, Japan, Korea, and European Union. However, paper submission by anyone in the whole world is welcome at any time. Its main concern is to showcase research articles of highest quality and significance within the disciplines of cognitive science, including, but not limited to, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, aesthetics, anthropology, and education, insofar as it is deemed to be of interest to those who pursue the study of mind. In particular, we would like to encourage submissions that cross the traditional disciplinary boundaries. The Journal of Cognitive Science (JCS) is published quarterly on 31 March, 30 June, 30 September, 31 December (founded in 2000) as the official journal of International Association for Cognitive Science (IACS) by the Institute for Cognitive Science at Seoul National University. It is a SCOPUS, ESCI, EBSCO, KCI journal. It aims to publish research articles of the highest quality and significance within the disciplines that form cognitive science, including philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, anthropology, and education for Interdisciplinary Journal. Submissions that cross traditional disciplinary boundaries in either themes or methods are especially encouraged. AI-associated Cognitive Science will be newly reinforced and papers in this area are encouraged to be submitted.
期刊最新文献
Effects of Case-marking on the Anticipatory Processing of Korean Sentences Code-switching Patterns of Educated and Non-educated Efik-English Bilinguals: A Descriptive Study Association and the Mechanisms of Priming Leveraging Cognitive Linguistic Approaches to Grammar Teaching with Multimedia Animations Thoughts on Consciousness
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1