{"title":"为何787客机延误不可避免?","authors":"Yao Zhao","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2647588","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Boeing 787, the Dreamliner, was the fastest-selling plane ever in the commercial aviation industry. However, its development was a nightmare – the first flight was delayed by 26 months, and the first delivery was delayed by 40 months with a cost overrun of at least $11 billion. By a comprehensive empirical study of the actual events and facts, we find strong evidence to suggest that a majority of the delays were intentional. An economic analysis of incentives and gaming behaviors in joint development projects discovers that the 787’s risk-sharing partnership forced Boeing and its partners to share the “wrong” risk. This led the firms into a Prisoner’s Dilemma, where delays were in the best interests of these firms, although doing so drove them into a disaster. We reconcile the economic analysis with the empirical evidence to reveal the rationale behind many seemingly irrational behaviors that delayed this program. Finally, we suggest a new “fair sharing” partnership to share the “right” risk and greatly alleviate delays for development programs of this kind.","PeriodicalId":82888,"journal":{"name":"Technology (Elmsford, N.Y.)","volume":"30 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-08-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Why 787 Delays Were Inevitable?\",\"authors\":\"Yao Zhao\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2647588\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Boeing 787, the Dreamliner, was the fastest-selling plane ever in the commercial aviation industry. However, its development was a nightmare – the first flight was delayed by 26 months, and the first delivery was delayed by 40 months with a cost overrun of at least $11 billion. By a comprehensive empirical study of the actual events and facts, we find strong evidence to suggest that a majority of the delays were intentional. An economic analysis of incentives and gaming behaviors in joint development projects discovers that the 787’s risk-sharing partnership forced Boeing and its partners to share the “wrong” risk. This led the firms into a Prisoner’s Dilemma, where delays were in the best interests of these firms, although doing so drove them into a disaster. We reconcile the economic analysis with the empirical evidence to reveal the rationale behind many seemingly irrational behaviors that delayed this program. Finally, we suggest a new “fair sharing” partnership to share the “right” risk and greatly alleviate delays for development programs of this kind.\",\"PeriodicalId\":82888,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Technology (Elmsford, N.Y.)\",\"volume\":\"30 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2015-08-19\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Technology (Elmsford, N.Y.)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2647588\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Technology (Elmsford, N.Y.)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2647588","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Boeing 787, the Dreamliner, was the fastest-selling plane ever in the commercial aviation industry. However, its development was a nightmare – the first flight was delayed by 26 months, and the first delivery was delayed by 40 months with a cost overrun of at least $11 billion. By a comprehensive empirical study of the actual events and facts, we find strong evidence to suggest that a majority of the delays were intentional. An economic analysis of incentives and gaming behaviors in joint development projects discovers that the 787’s risk-sharing partnership forced Boeing and its partners to share the “wrong” risk. This led the firms into a Prisoner’s Dilemma, where delays were in the best interests of these firms, although doing so drove them into a disaster. We reconcile the economic analysis with the empirical evidence to reveal the rationale behind many seemingly irrational behaviors that delayed this program. Finally, we suggest a new “fair sharing” partnership to share the “right” risk and greatly alleviate delays for development programs of this kind.