以GIFT-128为基本基元的三种aead的线性密码分析

IF 1.7 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology Pub Date : 2021-06-11 DOI:10.46586/tosc.v2021.i2.199-221
Ling Sun, Wei Wang, Meiqin Wang
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文研究了关联数据认证加密(AEADs) GIFT-COFB、SUNDAE-GIFT和HyENA的线性密码分析。所有这些提议都以GIFT-128作为基础原语。利用布尔可满足性问题(SAT)方法实现自动搜索,以搜索与这些原语的攻击设置匹配的线性逼近。使用新识别的近似,当底层原语被16轮、17轮和16轮版本的GIFT-128替换时,我们对GIFT-COFB、SUNDAE-GIFT和HyENA发起密钥恢复攻击。对GIFT-128对线性密码分析的抗性也进行了评估。我们利用新获得的19轮线性近似,提出了对GIFT-128的24轮密钥恢复攻击。我们注意到本文的攻击结果远未威胁到GIFT-COFB、SUNDAE-GIFT、HyENA和GIFT-128的安全性。
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Linear Cryptanalyses of Three AEADs with GIFT-128 as Underlying Primitives
This paper considers the linear cryptanalyses of Authenticated Encryptions with Associated Data (AEADs) GIFT-COFB, SUNDAE-GIFT, and HyENA. All of these proposals take GIFT-128 as underlying primitives. The automatic search with the Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT) method is implemented to search for linear approximations that match the attack settings concerning these primitives. With the newly identified approximations, we launch key-recovery attacks on GIFT-COFB, SUNDAE-GIFT, and HyENA when the underlying primitives are replaced with 16-round, 17-round, and 16-round versions of GIFT-128. The resistance of GIFT-128 against linear cryptanalysis is also evaluated. We present a 24-round key-recovery attack on GIFT-128 with a newly obtained 19-round linear approximation. We note that the attack results in this paper are far from threatening the security of GIFT-COFB, SUNDAE-GIFT, HyENA, and GIFT-128.
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来源期刊
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology Mathematics-Applied Mathematics
CiteScore
5.50
自引率
22.90%
发文量
37
期刊最新文献
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