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On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Anonymous Games
We show that the problem of finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in an {anonymous} game with seven pure strategies is complete in PPAD, when the approximation parameter ε is exponentially small in the number of players.
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